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I. INTRODUCTION

As U.S. firms collectively weather the relatively hostile
business climate in Japan, certain United States-based airlines
have been flying above it all for years. Those U.S. airline carriers
allowed to take advantage of the trans-Pacific passenger and
cargo market are doing well competing against their Asian
counterparts particularly on routes into and out of Japan. In
1995, U.S. airlines carried about sixty-five percent of the
passengers flying between the United States and Japan.' This
success alone generated a $5.3 billion aviation trade surplus in
1996-the only U.S. trade surplus with Japan. 2 Additionally, this
trade surplus is growing at a quarter of a billion dollars

1.
See U.S. Japan Aviation Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 105th Cong.
(1997), available in 1997 WL 11234085 (statement of John Dasburg, President
and CEO, Northwest Airlines) [hereinafter Dasburg Senate Testimony]; Marsha
Stopa, U.S.-Japan Talks Threaten to Close the 'Open Skies,' CRAIN's DETROIT Bus.,
Oct. 20, 1997, at 40, availablein 1997 WL 8577023.
2.
See Dasburg Senate Testimony, supra note 1; Stopa, supra note 1, at
40. The overall trade deficit with Japan in 1996 was about $48 billion and would

have been greater had it not been for the air service surplus. See Dasburg Senate
Testimony, supra note 1. Since the early 1980s, the United States trade deficit
with Japan has reached as high as $50-$60 billion annually. See U.S. Japan
Aviation Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL
11234082 (statement of Frederick Smith, Chairman and CEO of Federal Express)

[hereinafter Smith Senate Testimony].
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annually, 3 and it accounts for sixty percent of the $26 billion
4
travel surplus the United States has with the rest of the world.
However, most of the revenues generated by U.S. airlines
operating in the Japanese market have gone to just two passenger
carriers (Northwest and United) and one cargo carrier (Federal
Express).5 This concentration of revenue is the result of a 1952
bilateral aviation treaty between the United States and Japan that
provided significant access into the Japanese market only to
6
those three U.S. carriers.
After more than four decades under the treaty, the United
States and Japan agreed to a major revision of the agreement's
terms in 1998. 7 The new aviation agreement substantially alters
the original post-World War II treaty,s but falls short of the initial
9
U.S. goal of creating "open skies" between the two countries.

Under an open skies agreement, both countries would have
opened access to international airline routes between the two
countries and eliminated practically all domestic restrictions on

international carriers.1 0 The inability of the United States to
convince Japan to accept an open skies agreement may signal
trouble for future aviation agreement negotiations unless the
United States maintains its pragmatic approach, reaching the
optimal agreement given the economic and political climate in the
countries with which the United States is negotiating. 11

3.
See Dasburg Senate Testimony, supra note 1. The air service trade
surplus was $5 billion in 1995 and $4.8 billion in 1994. See id.
4.
See Dogfight Over Tokyo: The U.S.-JapanAir Spat, FAR E. ECON. REv.,
Aug. 14, 1997, at 5, availablein 1997 WL-FEER 11441533 [hereinafter Dogfight].
5.
See Japan, U.S. Close to Agreement: U.S. Air Industry Head, JAPAN
TRANSP. ScAN, Sept 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8250176 (noting that the
three companies enjoy special access rights) [hereinafter Close to Agreement].
6.
See id. See generally Civil Air Transport Agreement, Aug. 11, 1952,
U.S.-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 1948, 1949, which gave the United States and Japan the
power to designate which airlines would be able to fly under the terms of the
agreement. Id. at 1950. At the time the agreement was signed, Japan's first major
airline, Japan Airlines, "hadn't even gotten off the ground." Morning Edition
(National Public Radio radio broadcast, Sept. 22, 1997) (available in 1997 WL
12823289).
7.
See infranotes 395-99 and accompanying text. See generally infra Part
V (discussing US-Japan agreement). As Thomas Foley, then the newly-named
U.S. ambassador to Japan, stated at the height of the negotiations in the fall of
1997, the bilateral aviation agreement is "the most important bilateral
relationship the United States has." New Envoy to Japan Reassures Tokyo as He
Takes Up Post, Agence France-Presse, Nov. 7, 1997, available in 1997 WL
13429669.
8.
See infra notes 421-56 and accompanying text.

9.

See id.

10.
11.

See infra notes 30-44 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 531-40 and accompanying text.
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This Note analyzes the U.S.-Japanese aviation agreement and
the negotiations that led to its signing. More specifically, it
examines how the parties involved-including U.S. airline carriers
who disagreed as to how the United States should proceedinfluenced the negotiation process. Part II of the Note focuses on
the current U.S. policy of expanding open skies when negotiating
bilateral aviation treaties with foreign countries. Part III looks at
the U.S.-Japanese aviation market and its importance for U.S.
airlines. Part IV examines how the Japanese government
successfully used its strategic placement in the Asian market to
avoid U.S. efforts to impose an open skies agreement. In this
section, emphasis is placed on the peculiarities of relations
between the two countries under the 1952 agreement and how
the details of the new agreement represent a middle ground that
both countries hope to exploit. Part V describes the new 1998
bilateral agreement. Finally, Part VI predicts how the Japanese
future
aviation
"liberalization"
agreement
may
impact
negotiations: did the United States compromise its bargaining
position in future negotiations by "caving in" to Japan and
accepting an agreement that falls short of open skies? Or did the
United States correctly approach the negotiations pragmatically
and with an eye toward reaching the best agreement possible
given the circumstances? The Note attempts to answer these
questions and proposes how the United States should conduct
future aviation negotiations.

II. U.S. INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY BASED
ON EXPANDING "OPEN SKIES"

In an effort to better effectuate what had been an
unsuccessful U.S. international aviation policy goal of promoting
"unfettered operations for airlines," 12 the Clinton administration
sought to renegotiate bilateral agreements to encourage
competition.' 3 Patrick Murphy, the Clinton administration's

U.S. JapanAviation Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation
12.
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 105th Cong. (1997),
available in 1997 WL 11234084 (statement of Gerald L. Baliles, Chairman of
Access U.S.-Japan) [hereinafter Baliles Senate Testimony]. The United States goal
of creating a free market for international aviation has been in place for more

than 50 years. See id.
13.
See International Aviation Bilaterals and Code Sharing Relationships:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL 11233697 (statement of
Patrick V. Murphy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Aviation and
International Affairs) [hereinafter Murphy House Testimony]. There are currently
more than 1,200 bilateral aviation agreements in force worldwide. See Gerald L.
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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Aviation and
International Affairs, summarized the rationale for the current
U.S. policy while testifying before the House Aviation
Subcommittee in June of 1997: "Our aviation liberalization policy
is working to create a global environment in which well managed,
competitive air transportation companies can deliver the best
possible transport options to the travelling and shipping public
while earning profits for owners and offering well paying jobs to
employees." 14 In trying to create an international aviation market
based on competitive economic principles, the United States has
fought to eliminate foreign barriers that limit U.S. carrier access
to foreign markets when negotiating or renegotiating bilateral
agreements with other nations.15 Traditionally, bilateral aviation
agreements have strictly defined what routes may be served
between signing countries, whether the fares are subject to each
government's approval, how frequently flights may be offered, and
how many airlines may fly under the agreement. 16 As Deputy
Assistant Transportation Secretary Murphy bluntly described
before a congressional committee, the United States is trying to
move away from the traditional "tit-for-tat" protectionist bilateral
aviation agreements. 17 Instead, the United States has promised
foreign countries greater access for their carriers if they open
their aviation markets and commit to increased competition. 18
Despite financial problems in the 1990s, and what the U.S.
government characterizes as the "resurgence in foreign

Baliles, Fear of Flying: Aviation Protectionism and Global Growth, FOREIGN AFF.,
May 15, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 9287526. Aviation experts have
criticized the protectionist nature of the bilateral approach and have called the
array of bilateral agreements "a global regulatory morass." Id. The United States
negotiated its first bilateral aviation agreement with the United Kingdom in 1946.
See id.
14.
Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
15.
See id.International aviation is generally governed by bilateral trade
agreements because of a framework established by the United States and fifty-one
other nations in 1944 at the Chicago Conference on International Civil Aviation. See
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-99, INTERNATIONAL AVIATION: AIRLINE
ALLIANCES PRODUCE BENEFITS, Bur EFFECT ON COMPETITION IS UNCERTAIN (1995), at 11
<http://www.airportnetorg/dept/federal/gao/alliance.htm>
[hereinafter
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION]. For a detailed review of the 1944 Chicago Convention, see Daniel C.
Hedlund, Note, Toward Open Skies: LiberalizingTrade in InternationalAirline Services, 3

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 259, 265-68 (1994). As of February 1995, the United States was

a party to seventy-two bilateral aviation agreements. See INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra,
at 11. For a discussion of how the United States should use other tools in addition to
bilateral agreements to liberalize world aviation access, see generally Michael F.
Goldman, A Modest Proposalfor a Short-Term U.S. International Aviation Negotiation

Strategy, 8 AIR& SPACE LAW. 6, 9-12 (Winter 1994).
16.

See INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supranote 15, at 11.

17.
18.

See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
See id.
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government protectionism," U.S. air carriers competing in
record profits. 19
are experiencing
international markets
Furthermore, the airlines are projected to do well financially for
years to come. 20 In 1996, the major U.S.-based passenger and
cargo airlines reported a combined operating profit of $6 billion
and a combined net profit of $2.8 billion, according to the U.S.
Department of Transportation. 2 1 International operations alone
generated a combined operating profit of $629 million and a net
profit of $204 million. 22 The Transportation Department
attributes the strong financial position of U.S. airlines in the
international markets to the generally strong world economy, U.S.
airline efficiency, and the increasing demand for international air
23
travel caused by economic globalization.
Currently, forty percent of all world trade, as measured by
value, is transported by air.2 4 Between 1992 and 1996, the
number of international passengers flying U.S. airlines increased
by more than twenty-two percent. 25 That increase amounted to
26
ten million more international passengers flying U.S. carriers.
United States carriers are doing so well that it is not uncommon
for them to carry more passengers traveling between a foreign
country and the United States than the competing foreign
carrier.2 7 The amount of international freight carried by U.S.
carriers is increasing at an even faster pace than the passenger
market. Between 1992 and 1996, the amount of international

19.
Id.
20.
See id.
21.
See id.
22.
See id.
23.
See id.
24.
See Semi-Open Sides, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1997, at A24, available in
1997 WL 14706413; Smith Senate Testimony, supranote 2.
25.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13. Using another measure,
the General Accounting Office found the number of passengers flying U.S. carriers
between the United States and foreign countries increased by forty-seven percent
between 1987 and 1993. See INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note 15, at 2.
International passenger traffic from the United States and foreign countries
increased by one hundred and thirty-four percent from 1980 through 1993, See

id. at 10.
26.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
27.
See David Field, Open Skies Treaties Facing Turbulence, USA TODAY,
July 22, 1997, at 4B, available in 1997 WL 7008495. U.S. airlines carry 60.5
percent of the passenger traffic between the United States and Italy; 54.7 percent
between the United States and France; 50.4 percent between the United States
and Germany; 46.3 percent between the United States and the Netherlands; 46
percent between the United States and the United Kingdom; and 22.1 percent
between the United States and Japan. See id. (using U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service data for calendar year 1996 as analyzed by Global Aviation
Associates).
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cargo carried by U.S. airlines increased by fifty-nine percent. 28 In
real terms during the same time frame, international cargo traffic
29
on U.S. airlines increased by one million freight tons.
A. Open Skies as a Vehicle for Breaking
Down Aviation Trade Barriers
Under U.S. aviation policy, the ultimate goal for the United
States is to reach international agreements that embrace "open
skies."3 0 An open skies bilateral agreement allows for air carriers
of both signatory countries to compete on an equal basis for
passengers traveling between the two countries.3 1 Under this type
of pact, governmental barriers limiting a foreign carrier's access to
routes into and out of its country are eliminated and replaced
with a market-dominated allocation.3 2 Under a pure open skies
agreement, all restrictions on routes, capacity, frequency, pricing,
and entry are eliminated.3 3 The only aviation restrictions left in
place are those created by physical space constraints at airports
or required because of safety concerns.3 4 Furthermore, an open
skies agreement permits airline alliances in which a domestic and
foreign carrier join forces to jointly market and operate routes
assigned to them.3 5 This is known as code-sharing because the
two carriers may use each other's "designator code" when listing
their flights on computer reservation systems.3 6 Essentially, these

28.

See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.

29.
30.

See id.
See id.; U.S. DOT: Progress Toward Global Open Skies Accelerated in

1997, Secretary Slater Says, M2 Presswire, Jan. 7, 1998, available in 1998 WL

5044787 [hereinafter Global Open Skies]. Secretary of Transportation Rodney
Slater announced in January of 1998 that it was his goal to "reach Open Sides, or
be on a definitive path to Open Sides" with most major trading partners by the
year 2000. Id. See United States: Model BilateralAir TransportAgreement ("Open
Skies Agreement"), 35 I.L.M. 1479, 1479 (Nov. 1996) (listing the countries with
which the United States has already signed the Open Sides Agreement)
[hereinafter Model Bilateral].
31.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
32.
See id.; U.S. Japan Aviation Relations: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 105th Cong.
(1997), available in 1997 WL 11234081 (statement of Charles A. Hunnicutt,
Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Aviation and International Affairs)
[hereinafter Hunnicutt Senate Testimony].
33.
See Aviation Pact Eludes Japan, U.S., JAPAN TRANsP. SCAN, Sept. 29,
1997, available in 1997 WL 8250179 [hereinafter Aviation Pact]; Hunnicutt Senate
Testimony, supranote 32.
34.
See Aviation Pact,supranote 33.
35.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
36.
See INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supranote 15, at 13. The U.S. Department
of Transportation, which must approve code-sharing agreements, listed sixty-one
such agreements in 1994. See id. The Transportation Department has
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marketing alliances allow for "seamless connection" of internal
37
ticketing and seating operations between the partner carriers.
After what the U.S. Transportation Department calls "careful
consideration of their potential competitive consequences," it has
granted antitrust immunity to several of these strategic alliances
between U.S. and foreign carriers in an effort to increase
competition in the international aviation markets.3 8 Although not
highlighted publicly, the Transportation Department understands
that the "carrot" of antitrust exemption creates an incentive to get
countries with powerful airline carriers to the negotiating table.3 9
According to the U.S. Transportation Department, antitrust
immunity allows domestic and foreign carriers to integrate their
separate systems into a highly efficient network. 40 Transportation
Department officials have said that the agency believes antitrust
immunity may reduce competition among the partnership
carriers, but it results in more efficient competition among
various multicarrier networks. 4 1 United States officials and
aviation industry analysts supporting a free trade approach argue
that the increased competition will lead to lower fares for
consumers, better air service flying to more cities, increased
tourism, and more jobs. 4 2

traditionally not required approval for limited agreements between U.S. and
foreign carriers, such as those that allow for mutual acceptance of passenger
tickets, baggage checks and cargo waybills. See id. at 13. Likewise, agreements
that allow for the sharing of frequent flyer plans and airport facilities are not
reviewed by the Transportation Department. See id.
37.
No Deal in Latest Round of U.S.-Japan Aviation Talks, NIKKEI/Dow
JONES JAPAN REP., Oct. 25, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 12924111 [hereinafter No
Dealj.
38.
Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13. Under U.S. law, the
Secretary of Transportation may grant antitrust immunity if the airline agreement
is "in the public interest and is necessary to permit implementation of an
approved cooperative agreement." INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note 15, at 24,
Generally, the U.S. antitrust laws are designed to prevent competitors from
joining together and engaging in anti-competitive alliances. See id.
39.
See Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13. The Transportation
Department credits the early alliance between Northwest Airlines and the
Netherlands' KLM Airlines as being so successful that it influenced Germany's
decision to seek open skies. See id. Similarly, the United States is aware that the
United Kingdom's British Airways is seeking an alliance with American Airlines
and it is refusing to give antitrust immunity to the partnership until the United
Kingdom negotiates a more liberal aviation agreement. See id.
40.
See id.
41.
See id.
42.
InternationalAviation Bilaterals and Code SharingRelationships:Hearing
Before the Subcomrm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp. and
Infrastructure, 105th Cong. (1997), available in 1997 WL 11233691 (statement of
Mary Rose Loney, Commissioner, Chicago Department of Aviation) [hereinafter
Loney House Testimony].
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Another ingredient of the open skies agreement is a provision
that allows carriers from the signatory countries to fly through
4
each other's countries and on to third-country destinations. 3
These rights are called "beyond rights" or "fifth freedom rights" by
the industry. 44
B. Successful Negotiation of Open Skies Agreements
The U.S. government has been fairly successful in negotiating
open skies agreements with many smaller countries. In effect,
some nations simply agreed to open skies pacts upon invitation
by the United States. In deciding which countries to first pursue
for open skies negotiations, the United States has focused not
purely on the economic value of the various international
markets, but instead has looked to which markets have "strategic
value in influencing the transformation of entire regions." 45 As of
August 1998, the United States had reached open skies accords
with thirty-one countries. 4 6 Because of the U.S. progress in
negotiating with countries for aviation liberalization treaties, onethird of U.S. international passengers in 1997 were expected to fly
47
under open skies.
1. Europe
The United States completed its first open skies agreement
with the Netherlands in 1992, and it was entered into force in
May of 1993.48 In 1995, the United States offered any country in
Europe the opportunity to enter into an open-market aviation
agreement with the United States. 49 As of August 1998, the
United States had open skies agreements with thirteen European

43.

See generally Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supranote 32, (discussing

this concept in the context of current Japanese restrictions).
44.
See generally Dasburg Senate Testimony, supra note 1 (discussing
Japanese negotiation strategy of withholding beyond rights from some U.S.

carriers).
45.
Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
46.
See U.S. and British 'Open Skies' Talks Set for October,WALL ST. J., Aug.
3, 1998, at B6, availablein 1998 WL-WSJ 3503924 [hereinafter Open Skies Talks].
47.
See Field, supra note 27, at 4B. As a Wall Street Journalstory noted:
the open skies pacts "have made trans-Atlantic travel easier for passengers, while
cutting costs and boosting traffic for carriers." Charles Goldsmith, Open-Skies
Pacts Lift U.S., European Carriers,WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1997, at A15, available in
1997 WL-WSJ 14167422.
48.
See Model Bilateral,supra note 30, at 1479; see also Field, supra note
27, at 4B; Goldsmith, supranote 47, at A15.

49.

See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
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nations.5 0 France and the United States reached an aviation
agreement in 1998 that liberalized aviation access, but it failed to
implement open skies. 5 ' In addition, as of August 1998, the
United States was in negotiations with Italy to complete an open
skies pact.5 2 These agreements allowed any U.S. carrier to
network with their counterparts in the signatory countries, if they
could work out partnership agreements with the foreign
airlines.5 3 Both U.S. and foreign airlines took advantage of the
open skies agreements and negotiated among themselves
partnership agreements that combined their resources to service
the international markets. S 4 Even though beyond rights were
sought in the European aviation agreements, the U.S. airlines
have found it more efficient to rely on their foreign partners' wellestablished routes for travel beyond the airport in which the U.S.
5s
carrier traditionally lands.
Within a year of the Netherlands agreement, Northwest
Airlines aligned with KLM Royal Dutch Airlines. 56 Under the

Northwest partnership with KLM, which was given antitrust

immunity by the U.S. government, 57 the two carriers posted

50.
See infra notes 51 and 52. In addition to the Netherlands, the following
European countries accepted the U.S. offer and adopted open sides agreements
with the United States: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland,
Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. See Open Skies Momentum
Slows, But Pace May Quicken Again, WORLD AIRLINEs NEWS, June 10, 1996,
availablein LEXIS, MARKET Library, IACNWS File [hereinafter Momentum Slows].
Romania reached an open sides agreement with the United States in 1997. See
Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13; Global Open Skies, supra note 30. The
Romanian open sides agreement was formally signed in Washington, D.C. in July
1998. See U.S. and Netherlands Antilles Officials Signed an Open-Skies Pact, 333
AVIATION DAILY 92 (1998), availablein 1998 WL 9034456.
51.
See Sue Kendall, France, United States Sign Air TransportLiberalisation
Deal, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2257891. The
deal fell short of open skies because France will continue to prohibit U.S. carriers
from taking on passengers in France destined for locations other than the United
States. See id.
52.
See U.S.-Italy Open-Skies Talks Scheduled This Week in Washington
Have Been Postponed,333 AVIATION DAILY 69 (1998).
53.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
54.
See Goldsmith, supranote 47, at A15.
55.
See id.
56.
See Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13. The General Accounting
Office estimated that the Northwest/KLM agreement produced between $125 and
$175 million in added revenues for Northwest in 1994. See INTERNATIONAL AVIATION,

supranote 15, at 28. These figures accounted for about one-third of Northwest's transAtlantic passenger revenues in that year. See id. More than 350,000 passengers flew
on Northwest under the alliance in the year ending June 1994, compared to about
164,000 flying the airline on connecting Northwest/KLM flights before the agreement
in 1991. See id at 27.
57.

See INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supranote 15, at 24.

U.S.-JAPANESE AVIATION TALKS

1998]

1217

greatly increased profits and traffic. s s Delta Airlines followed
Northwest's lead and created partnerships with Austrian, Sabena,
and SwissAir.5 9 United Airlines joined their U.S. competitors and
allied with Germany's Lufthansa. 60 Like the Northwest/KLM
partnership, the Lufthansa/United operating agreement increased
passenger traffic for the two airlines. 6 1 The Lufthansa pact was
signed in 1994, before Germany agreed to open skies, but the
partnership was allowed to expand with open skies eliminating
barriers to "coordination of schedules and pricing."6 2 Lufthansa
claimed that its pact with United, Scandinavian Airlines System,
Air Canada, and Thai Airways helped increase its trans-Atlantic
traffic by twenty-one percent in the first half of 1997.63 In 1997,
United increased its flight service between Frankfurt and
Washington and Chicago from one flight a day to two, and added
64
a Duesseldorf to Chicago flight

The U.S. Transportation Department credits these alliances
and the competition they created for German-based Lufthansa
airlines, despite its initial limited alliance with United, with forcing
Germany to "abandon protectionism" and join the open skies
agreement. 65 According to the Transportation Department, forty
percent of all traffic between the United States and Europe falls
under the open skies regime. 66 Additionally, the Department of
Transportation claims that the success of the open skies initiative
has brought Spain, Italy, and France to the negotiating table to
discuss opening their aviation markets to increased competition
from U.S. carriers. 67 Portugal was expected to begin open skies
talks in 1998.68 Reports also indicated that Hungary and other
countries of the former Eastern Bloc have signaled they are
69
contemplating open skies negotiations.

58.
See Goldsmith, supra note 47, at A15. The Northwest/KLM joint
venture was "so successful, in fact" that the Wall Street Journal reported the
linkup "led to a bitter shareholding dispute." Id.
59.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
60.
See Goldsmith, supranote 47, at A15.
61.
See id.
62.
Id.
63.
See id.
64.
See id. A United spokesperson emphasized that the route expansion
was the result of the open skies agreement with Germany: "It's the sort of route

that open skies helps you to launch, while code-sharing makes it profitable." Id.

65.

Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.

66.

See id.

67.
note 50.
68.
69.

See id.; Goldsmith, supra note 47, at A15; Momentum Slows, supra
See Global Open Skies, supranote 30.
See Goldsmith, supra note 47, at A15; Momentum Slows, supra note
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The European Commission (EC) has indicated that it will likely
embrace open skies in the future, according to the U.S.
Transportation Department. 70 However, in 1998 the EC threatened
to undermine open skies agreements by threatening to place limits
on code-sharing alliances. 7 1 The very reason that there is no aviation
treaty among European countries now is because of protectionist
policies implementd by European governments. 72 Nowhere is this
reluctance more evident than in the case of Britain, which is
particularly concerned about opening its aviation markets to U.S.
competition.7" The United States has been in protracted negotiations
with Great Britain for years, but has yet to come up with an
agreement that satisfies both the U.S. government's goal of
liberalization and the British goal of insulating its carriers from fierce
international competition.7 4 Perhaps the largest obstacle standing in
the way of an agreement between the major European countries, as
well as nations in other parts of the world, is the general feeling that
the United States is not bargaining fairly. 75 When determining
whether the European market will open its skies, the question seems
to be whether the competitive pressures will force the major
European countries to look at opportunities in the European market
without casting their sights across the Atlantic toward U.S. skies.
2. The Americas
The United States has also been negotiating open skies
agreements in the Western Hemisphere. Canada agreed to open
skies in 1995.76 Patrick Murphy, the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Transportation for Aviation told Congress that the U.S.-Canada
agreement has been "impressive".7 7 In addition, passenger volume
between the United States and Canada has increased by twenty-

70.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
71.
See Charles Goldsmith and Julie Wolf, EU Approves AMR/British
Airways Alliance, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1998, at A3 [hereinafter EU Approves
Alliance]; EC vs. EU, FOREIGN REP., June 25, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 7895438.
72.
See Goldsmith, supranote 47, at A15.
73.
See id.
74.
See infra notes 519-28 and accompanying text for a detailed
discussion of the status of U.S.-United Kingdom aviation negotiations.

75.

As the Wall Street Journal noted: "There's a feeling in some European

circles that the deals favor the U.S. because U.S. law forbids foreign airlines from
carrying passengers within the U.S. itself-the world's largest single aviation
market." Goldsmith, supranote 47, at A15.
76.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
77.
Id.
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eight percent under the open skies agreement. 78 In 1998, the
79
transition agreement with Canada was to be implemented fully.
In the fall of 1996, the United States offered to accept open
skies agreements with any interested country in Central
America.8 0 As of the fall of 1997, the United States had reached
agreements with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,

Nicaragua, and Panama. 8 ' Aruba and Chile also signed open
skies agreements with the United States in late 1997.82 A
temporary agreement between the United States and Chile that
froze growth of capacity was scheduled to expire in 1997 and
revert back to the previous agreement, which had no limits on
capacity growth.8 3 The U.S.-Chile open skies agreement is
conditioned on U.S. antitrust immunity for an American
Airlines/ LanChile partnership agreement. 8 4 In addition, the
United States reached an open skies agreement with Peru in May
of 1998.85
As of 1998, the United States was in negotiations with
Argentina,8 6 Belize, and the Dominican Republic. 8 7 The United
States also was pursuing initial negotiations with Colombia.8 8
Under a Colombia-United States bilateral agreement, U.S. carriers

78.
See Field, supranote 27, at 4B.
79.
See Baliles, supranote 13, at 8. The agreement has been so successful
that in August of 1998, Air Canada announced that it had begun service to its
forty-third new U.S. destination since open sides was implemented. Air Canada:
Air Canada Launches Toronto-New Orleans Service, M2 Presswire, August 14,
1998, available in 1998 WL 16517695.
80.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
81.
See id.
82.
See Global Open Skies, supranote 30.
83.
See Momentum Slows, supranote 50.
84.
See Christopher Fotos, New Entrants Shold [sic] be Careful What They
Wish for Open Skies: All Targets Lie Ahead, 331 AVIATION DAILY 25 (1998), available
in 1998 WL 9030077. Some have expressed concern over the partnership because
together the two airlines control eighty-one percent of the passenger seats in the
U.S.-Chile market. See Scott McCartney & Jonathan Friedland, The Aviation
Industry: American Threatens and Cajoles Carriersto Ally With it in Latin American
Drive, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1998, at 11, available in 1998 WL-WSJA
3468160. American Airlines is the dominant carrier in Latin America, and it has
been aggressive in expanding in the area. See id.
85.
See U.S. Department of Transportation, News Release, United States,
Peru Sign Open Skies Agreement, June 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 308114;
see also All's Not Fine with Open-Skies Pact, SOUTH AM. REP., July 1, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 10367285 (despite new pact with Peru, Miami-based Fine
Air is still banned from Peruvian air space); Peru Becomes First Open-Skies Partner
for U.S. in South America, 332 AVIATION DAILY 438 (1998), available in 1998 WL
9033690.
86.
See U.S., Argentina Plan Open-Skies Talks in October, 333 AVIATION
DAILY 193 (1998), availablein 1998 WL 9034935.
87.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
88.
See Momentum Slows, supranote 50.
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would have access to Colombia from New York, but Colombia has

been unwilling to give its approval.8 9 Colombia has expressed its
concern that American and Continental flights will eat into the
revenue of its national airline, Avianca. 90 The United States has
threatened to sanction Avianca, and industry analysts indicate
91
that the dispute may spur talks that could lead to open skies.
3. Pacific Rim
The United States has also initiated discussions with
countries in the Pacific Rim for open skies. In a "first step," the
United States has focused on Singapore, Taiwan, Brunei,
Malaysia, Korea, and New Zealand. 92 As of summer 1997,
Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Brunei had formally
signed agreements. 93 Later in 1997, Taiwan also reached an open
skies accord with the United States. 94 Singapore's willingness to
sign on to open skies was not surprising. Singapore is a major
aviation hub in the Southeast Asian market, home to a strong
carrier, and it "lusts for more trade."9 5 New Zealand's assent was
not unexpected either, for it had already been pursuing liberal
aviation agreements to boost its standing in the aviation
market. 9 6 South Korea signed on to an open skies agreement with
the United States in June 1998. 9 7 South Korea's Asiana Airlines

wanted to pursue more access to the U.S. market, and it lobbied
98
its government to begin negotiations.
The Taiwan agreement allows unlimited service by U.S.
carriers into Taipei and Kaohsiung. 99 In exchange, Taiwan-based
airlines have unlimited access into Honolulu, Seattle, San
Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas, and New York.100 This expansion

89.
90.

See id.
See id.

91.
92.

See id.
Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supra note 32;

Murphy House

Testimony, supranote 13.

93.
94.
95.

See Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supranote 32.
See Global Open Sides, supranote 30.
Bob James, Opening Asian Skies: The United States Isn't Wditing to See

Whether Its EuropeanStrategy Works Before ExportingIt to Asia, AIR CARGO WORLD,

Oct. 1996, at 16, available in LEXIS, TRANS Library, AIR File.

96.

See id.

97.
See U.S., South Korea Sign Open Skies Accord, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., June 15, 1998, at 38, availablein 1998 WL 8144319.

98.

See James, supra note 95, at 16; see also Delta, Korean Air Sign

Agreement to Form Global Marketing Alliance, M2 Presswire, Aug. 10, 1998,
availablein 1998 WL 16516733.
99.
See U.S.!Taivan Pact a 'Modelfor Bilateral Agreement,' ASIAN AVIATION
NEWS, June 16, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 6690472.
100. See id.
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is based on the expectation of receiving open skies in the
future.' 0 1 Taiwan's China Airlines is seeking the official open
skies agreement with the United States because it wants even
0 2
more access to the U.S. market.1
Taiwan's China Airlines is showing its desire to expand and
ability to compete by leasing and buying additional aircraft to
meet growing demand.1 0 3 Taiwan's second carrier, Eva Air, is also
planning international expansion.1 0 4 Eva Air began service to
Brussels, Belgium in 1997, and company officials have said it will
expand elsewhere if it gets the aviation rights.'l0 Taiwan is
currently the major hub for the United Parcel Service in the
Southeast Asian market, and the nation is seeking to upgrade its
status as an even larger international aviation port. 10 6 Taiwan
recognizes that it is "strategically located near the booming South
China market," and for that reason it poses a "challenge to
10 7
Japan's dominance of trans-Pacific travel."
Overall, the United States has approached smaller countries
in the Asian market in hopes of pressuring Japan into agreeing to
negotiate an open skies agreement.' 08 The underlying goals of
open skies agreements with the smaller Asian nations include not
only providing better air service to Asia, but also sending a
warning signal to Japan that it may lose its prominent hub status
as other countries become accessible to U.S. carriers.' 0 9 Still,
Japan is pivotal to the entire Asian aviation market, and it is
aware that it has a great deal of leverage. 110 Primarily, this
leverage comes from the fact that Japan's gross domestic product
remains greater than the combined value of all the countries with
whom the United States has reached open skies agreements."'
United States Department of Transportation officials deny the
U.S. aviation plan is meant to "surround and capture" the
Japanese, but they admit the plan is designed to fight Japanese

101.
See JapaneseCarriersStill Need to Worry More About PacificCompetition
Than Domestic Deregulation, ASIAN AVIATION NEWS, Jan. 24, 1997, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, AAVN File [hereinafter JapaneseCarriers].

102.

See id. A China Airlines official noted that the airline expects open

skies: "That's the trend. Most carriers, especially in the Orient, expect it." Id.
103. See id. China Airlines is leasing six Boeing 737-400 aircraft until it can
take delivery of six new Boeing 737-800s in late 1998. See id. The airline is
buying four Boeing 747s with the option to buy 4 more. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. Eva Air is also purchasing aircraft to help it prepare for future
international expansion. See id.

106.

See James, supranote 95, at 16.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

JapaneseCarriers,supranote 101.
See James, supranote 95, at 16.
See id.
See Dogfight, supranote 4, at 5.
See id.
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addition, the United States hopes to receive the assistance of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
a group of twenty-nine major industrialized nations from Europe,
North America, and the Pacific that supports global aviation
liberalization. 115

III. JAPANESE AND ASIAN MARKETS VITAL TO THE U.S. AIRLINES
Despite whatever international help it can get, the United
States is going to have a difficult time convincing Japan to further
open its aviation market. Japan is a formidable adversary intent
on protecting its valuable market, and it has proven its
116
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willingness to reject an immediate transition to open skies.
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112. James, supranote 95, at 16.
113. See Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13; Baliles, supra note 13,
at8.
114. See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
115. See id. According to the Transportation Department, the group
"advocates the overhaul of the currently regulation-bound international air
transportation system and the establishment of one based more on market
principles." Id. Japan is aware of the OECD's position on liberalizing aviation
agreements. When Japan held an aviation conference (closed to the West) in
1996, it "fought vigorously" against the position of the OECD's paper. James,
supranote 95, at 16.
116. See No Deal, supra note 37.
117. See Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supra note 32; Michael Goldman,
U.S.-JapanAviation Wars: Negotiating Not-Quite-Open Skies, 12 AIR AND SPACE LAW.
1, 6 (Summer 1997). The sheer size of the U.S.-Japan aviation market should be
of no surprise considering that Japan is the United States' second largest
international trading partner. See Baliles Senate Testimony, supra note 13. U.S.
businesses sell more goods to Japan than to Great Britain, France, Italy, and
Spain combined. See id.
118. See Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supranote 32; Goldman, supra note
117, at 6.
119. See Japan-U.S. Aviation Talks Fail to Reach Accord, Agence FrancePresse, Sept. 26, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 13402366 [hereinafter Aviation Talks

1998]

U.S.-JAPANESE AVIATION TALKS

1223

U.S.-Japan passenger and cargo market is "crucial to hundreds of
billions more in business exchanges." 120 In 1995, U.S. carriers
alone derived about $4.9 billion in gross revenue from the U.S.Japan passenger market and about $1 billion from cargo
transportation between the countries. 121 The market is

particularly lucrative because these flights are "among the
longest-haul routes in the world," and airlines can get top prices
22
for their services.1
In 1995, U.S. carriers dominated their competitors in the
U.S.-Japan market. U.S. carriers held about sixty-three percent of
the passenger market and fifty-three percent of the cargo
market.' 2 3 Aviation analysts looking at figures for 1996 estimate
that about eleven million passengers fly in the U.S.-Japan market
each year. 12 4 According to a study completed by Washington,
D.C.-based GKMG Consulting Services for Northwest Airlines, the
U.S.-Japan market is expected to continue to grow, reaching 15.6
million passengers by the year 2000.125 That represents a thirty
126
percent increase over four years.
A. Japan: Gateway to Asia
While the aviation routes in Europe, Central America and the
Pacific Rim are attractive to U.S. carriers, the routes between the
United States and Japan appear particularly lucrative. The right
to travel through the country is important because of "Japan's
unique geographic and demographic value." 127 Not only do the
U.S.-Japan routes account for substantial revenue in themselves,

Fail]. Others estimate that the U.S.-Japan market is worth $12 billion annually.
See Semi-Open Skies, supranote 24, at A24.
120.
Semi-Open Skies, supranote 24, at A24.
121.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
122.
U.S. Airlines Have a Yen for Japan Service, TRAVEL AGENT, Sept. 22,
1997, at 112, available in 1997 WL 15017943 [hereinafter Yen for Japan]. The
down-side to the relatively high fares for flights between the United States and
Japan is that Asian passengers may choose not to fly in times of economic
instability and foreign currency crises. See Fotos, supranote 84, at 25.
123.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
124.
See American, Delta and Others Form New Coalitionto Push U.S.-Japan
Talks, AIRLINE FIN. NEWs, Feb. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8068693
[hereinafter New Coalition]; Yen for Japan,supranote 122, at 112.
125.
See Tony Kennedy, NWA Hopes for 'Open Skies' Are Fading, STAR-TRIB.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Sept. 19, 1997, at 1D, available in 1997 WL
7582673; Yen for Japan,supranote 122, at 112.
126.
See Kennedy, supranote 125, at 1D; Yen for Japan, supranote 122, at
112.
127.
United Cites Value of Japan in Booz Allen Study, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS,
Oct. 9, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 6155955 [hereinafter Booz Allen Study].
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128
but they are feeder routes into the entire Asian-Pacific market.
As Charles Hunnicutt, the Assistant Secretary of Transportation
for Aviation and International Affairs, explained to a Senate
committee: "Because of the size of the Japanese market and
Japan's geographic location as a natural gateway to Asia, access
to Japan is almost essential to any carrier that wishes to compete
129
successfully on the transpacific."

Japan represents more than sixty percent of the traffic
between the U.S. mainland and Asia, or five million passengers a
year. 130 Tokyo's Narita airport has itself been called the gateway
to Asia and described as "the only conceivable point for a limitedrange plane from the United States to refuel before delivering
people to other countries in the region." 13 United Airlines officials
in 1995 publicly stated that Japan was essential to their Asia
routes because many of the destinations which can be served
efficiently through Tokyo are "either too distant or have
insufficient demand to serve nonstop from the United
States ... ."132 However, others have pointed out that the
introduction of new aircraft such as the Boeing 777, the MD1 1ER, and the Airbus A-340, might make non-stop travel between
the United States and cities in eastern Asia more cost effective. 133
If that happens, it4 is likely to make Japan "less important as a
13
gateway to Asia."

128.

See id. Estimates as to the value of beyond rights into Asia from Japan

vary widely. Dueling studies found that if U.S. carriers were to lose those beyond
rights it could cost the U.S. airlines anywhere from $5.5 billion to $100 billion
over a 20 year period. Compare UAL Sees $100 Billion U.S. Stake in Asian Markets,
AIRLINE FIN. NEws, Oct. 2, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6703799 (stating the
potential gain to Japanese carriers), with Access: U.S.-Japan Study Says United
Claims Are Exaggerated, WORLD AIRLINE NEWs, March 4, 1996, available in 1996
WL 8067369 (estimating the loss to United and Northwest).

129.

130.

Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supranote 32.
See Yen for Japan, supra note 122, at 112. For Northwest

Airlines,

flights connecting through Japan represent about eighty percent of its Pacific Rim
business. See Tony Kennedy, Northwest Reports Record Profit, STAR-TRIW.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Jan. 21, 1998, at 1D, available in 1998 WL
6338076 [hereinafter Record Profit].
131.
Michele Kayal, Britain, Japan:FormidableHead W1inds to Open Skies, J.
OF CoM., Apr., 14, 1997, at 1A.
BoozAllen Study, supranote 127.
132.
See id.; Goldman, supra note 117, at 8. However, the use of larger
133.
aircraft may not be feasible for international airlines service. One study found
that growth in the Asian market will require airlines to expand frequencies and
increase point-to-point services in Asia, requiring the use of more planes, not
bigger planes. See Study: Increase in Frequencies,Not Aircraft Size, Will Be Key to
Growth in Asia/Pacific, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, July 18, 1997, available in LEXIS,
MARKET Library, IACNWS File [hereinafter Growth in Asia/Pacific].
Booz Allen Study, supranote 127.
134.
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Some Asian aviation analysts have speculated that Hong
Kong could be used as an alternative gateway to Asia, but there is
concern that it is too congested. 13 5 Hong Kong also may be
unable to convince carriers that it is viable because it is so far
south. 136 Even Korea has been suggested as a potential
alternative to Japan. 137 A new airport is expected to open in
Seoul around the year 2000, but the dominance of the flag carrier
may keep out foreign competition. 138 Additionally, Thailand is
making efforts to expand its aviation capabilities. 13 9 Thai officials
hope to complete much of the construction on a new "transpark"
by 2000.140 The transpark combines air cargo facilities, a deep14 1
sea port, modern highways, and railways into one location.
Thailand is already the fourth busiest air cargo port in Asia, and
42
it ranks fifth in passenger traffic in Asia. 1
B. Phenomenal Growth in Asian Markets
On the worldwide scale, the Asian-Pacific aviation market
represents a great opportunity for all international carriers
because of its expected growth in the upcoming years. The AsianPacific aviation market currently is valued at $14 billion, 14 3 and it
is estimated that Asian-Pacific air traffic will double in the next
ten years. 144 The annual growth rate of the Asian-Pacific market
is expected to be between seven and ten percent. 145 China is
predicted to lead other Asian nations in growth. China accounted

for slightly more than five percent of Asia-Pacific travel in 1985,
and that figure was expected to grow to twenty-six percent by
2010.146 The Air Transport Action Group has concluded that this
growth in the Asia aviation market represents a growth that

135.

See id.

136.

See id.

137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Bid to Make U-Tapao Regional Aviation Hub: But Three Issues Need
to Be Resolved, Warns Project Consultants,BANGKOK POST, Jan. 20, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 7886691.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See United in the Asian Sky, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 24, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 15659261 [hereinafter Asian Sky].
144. See id.
145. See Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13; Asian Sky, supra note
143. Downturns in the Asian economy can certainly impact aviation growth. In

1998, just such a downturn in Asia forced carriers to reconfigure their fleets to
reduce excess capacity into and out of Asia. See James Ott, Air Transport,
AVIATION WK. & SPACETECH., Aug. 24, 1998, at 32.
146. See Growth in Asia/Pacific,supranote 133.

1226

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [VoL. 31:1207

exceeds the rate of other overseas markets.14 7 Furthermore, the
region is expected to account for forty percent of global air traffic
by the year 2000.148
In the last decade, air traffic between the United States and
Southeast Asia has more than tripled.1 4 9 This growth will
continue into the next decade. By 2010, it is estimated that there
will be approximately 288 million international passengers
traveling annually in the intra-Asian markets alone.' 50 Also by
2010, passenger travel in the Asian markets is expected to
account for half of all the world's passenger traffic. 1 5 ' Seventy
percent of the passengers will be traveling within the region,
fifteen percent will be crossing the Pacific from the Americas, and
fifteen percent will travel from Europe and elsewhere. 1 52 The
Pacific Travel Association's 1993 Travel Statistical Report found
that passenger arrivals in the Asia-Pacific region increased 7.3
percent from 1992 to 1993.153 That trend matches the expected
market breakdown because it showed that outbound U.S. travel
from Asia remained basically the same at about nine million, but
inter-Asian arrivals had increased from twenty-one million to
thirty-three million from 1989 through 1993.154 The report also
showed that Hong Kong, Japan, and China were the three most
15 5
popular international travel destinations for U.S. travelers.
Hong Kong and Japan have held the top ranking since the late
same time China moved up from
1980s. 15 6 However, during that
5 7
ten to three on the rankings.'
Cargo transportation is also expected to increase in the Asian
region. In 1995, Boeing projected that worldwide air cargo traffic
would grow at 6.6 percent annually through 2014, or more than

147. See id.
See Asian Sky, supranote 143.
148.
149.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
150.
See Dasburg Senate Testimony, supranote 1.
151.
See Asian CarriersGet Warnings on Competition, 'AmericaProblem,' 322
AVIATION DAILY 327 (1995), available in 1995 WL 13297413 [hereinafter Warnings];
Asra Q. Nomani & Douglas A. Blackmon, U.S., JapanNear Accord To Open Skies,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1997, at A3. It is also estimated that by 2010 more than
half of all U.S. international passengers will be flying to Asia. See International
Aviation Bilaterals and Code Sharing Relationships: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the House Comm. on Trasp. and Infrastructure,105th Cong. (1997),
available in 1997 WL 11233693 (statement of Robert Crandall, Chairman and
CEO of American Airlines) [hereinafter Crandall House Testimony].
152.
See Warnings, supranote 151, at 327.
153.
See MarketingBriefs, AIRLINE MARKETING NEWs, Aug. 31, 1994, available
in 1994 WL 8734431.
154. See id.
See id.
155.
156.
See id.

157.

See id.
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the 5.1 percent growth it projected for passenger travel.15 8
Charles Tyler, a Malaysia-based aerospace specialist, predicted
that the Asian cargo market will grow even more than the Asian
passenger market.15 9
Given this pace of economic growth, it is no surprise that the
60
U.S. carriers are scrambling to enter the Asian market.'
Aviation expert Charles Tyler agrees that U.S. carriers should be
investing in the Asian aviation market. Tyler estimated that the
aviation market in Vietnam is expected to grow nineteen percent a
year; China is expected to grow at seventeen percent annually,
and Taiwan at more than eleven percent.' 6 ' The growth is
expected to come primarily from tourism, not only from Europe,
but also from some regions of Asia where the population is using
62
newly acquired wealth to pay for travel.1
For U.S. carriers, the growing Asian market represents a
global economic shift. In 1980, Atlantic routes generated twice the
annual revenue of Pacific routes. 16 3 Recently, however, U.S.

Transportation Secretary Federico Pena announced that U.S.

airlines will be generating more revenue from trans-Pacific than

from trans-Atlantic flights in the near future.' 64 In 1995, United
and Northwest led the U.S. carriers in the Asian market,
generating $961
million and $835 million in revenue
respectively.' 65 United gained a net profit of $109 million in the
Asian market in 1995, and Northwest followed with a net profit of
$100 million.' 6 6 As a result of this steady foothold in Asia, and

158.
See Joan M. Feldman, Doing the Rights Thing, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD,
Dec. 1995, at 57, 57.
159.
See Warnings, supranote 151, at 327.
160.
One U.S. newspaper advocating open skies summed up the reasons for
U.S. airline interest in Asia: "Owing to Asia's dense population and growing
economic strength, increased presence in the region is of utmost importance to
U.S. air carriers . . . ." Open Skies Should be Goal of Talks, NEws-TRIBUNE
(Tacoma, Wash.), Sept. 24, 1997, at A12, available in 1997 WL 3461297
[hereinafter Open Shies Goal].
161. See Warnings, supra note 151, at 327.
162.
See id.
163.
See id.
164.
See The Future of CommercialAviation: Consolidationand PacificRoutes,
AM. MARKETPLACE, Nov. 16, 1995, available in 1995 WL 8155314 [hereinafter
PacificRoutes].
165.
See New Coalition,supra note 124.
166.
See id. In 1997 an Asian currency crisis was temporarily eating away
at airlines' profits in the Asian market. For example, Northwest's Pacific division
witnessed a seventy percent decrease in operating income between 1996 and
1997-from $168 million to about $50 million. See Record Profit, supra note 130,
at 1D. As a result of the currency crisis, Northwest actually planned to reduce its
capacity in the Pacific by about ten percent for the first quarter of 1998. See id.
The U.S. airline industry as whole was expected to temporarily reduce traffic for
the first half of 1998 to minimize income lost because of empty seats. See id.
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the sea-change taking place in the global aviation market, Pena
said the Clinton administration had "turned [its] sights to Asia,
167
the fastest-growing market in the world."

IV. JAPAN REFUSES TO ACCEPT OPEN SKIES
Under the 1952 bilateral aviation agreement, Northwest,
United, and Federal Express are the only U.S. carriers that have
authority to fly freely into Japan, conditioned upon safety
restrictions and space availability. 168 Essentially, these three U.S.
carriers compete in the Japanese market on a level playing field
with their counterparts in Japan. Together with the one Japanese
carrier that was given liberal access to the U.S. market, Japanese
Airlines (JAL), these airlines are known as "incumbent" carriers in
the industry. 16 9 Northwest has been an incumbent airline since
the agreement's inception. 17 0 United gained incumbent rights
when it purchased Pan Am's entire Pacific division in 1985.171
Federal Express received incumbent rights by acquiring the
privileges from the cargo carrier Flying Tigers in 1989.172
The U.S. incumbent carriers have leveraged their rights in
the Japanese and Asian markets, making them some of the more
highly utilized carriers in the region. Similarly, United and
Northwest dominate the routes between the United States and
Japan. Together, the two U.S. carriers fly more than eighty-five
percent of American passengers in the U.S.-Japan aviation
market. 173 When all passengers in the U.S.-Japan routes are
included, United, Northwest, and Japan Airlines fly eighty percent
of the passenger traffic between the two nations. 17 4 The second
Japanese airline, All Nippon Airways (ANA), along with three U.S.
carriers, share the remaining twenty percent of traffic between the
167. PacificRoutes, supranote 163.
168.
See Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supra note 32. Importantly, neither
Japan nor the United States have "cabotage" rights, or the right to fly intracountry routes freely. See Civil Air Transport Agreement, supranote 6, 4 U.S.T. at
1950; see also U.S., Japan Settle in For Long Match Over Beyond Rights, AIRLINE
FIN. NEws, Oct. 9, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6703829 [hereinafter Beyond

Rights].
169.
See Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supranote 32.
170.
See Booz Allen Study, supranote 127.
171.
See id.; New Coalition, supranote 124. Pan Am sold its Asian rights to
United for $750 million. John Schmeltzer & Mike Doming, U.S.-Japan Deal in
FinalApproach, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1998, at 1.
172.
See Smith Senate Testimony, supranote 2; Feldman, supra note 158,
at 58.
173.
See Yen for Japan,supranote 122, at 112.
174.
See ANA Plans 25 Percent InternationalCapacity Growth in 1997, 327
AVIATION DAILY 223 (1997), available in 1997 WL 8611893 [hereinafter ANA Plans].
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United States and Japan. 7 5 The incumbent carriers owe their
success to their status under the 1952 agreement. 17 6
Northwest Airlines, which operates 245 flights per week
between the United States and Japan, provides more flights
between the two countries than any other airline. 17 7 Northwest
derives an estimated thirty percent of its revenue from its flights
between the United States and Asia.' 7 8 It is also estimated that
twenty-five percent of Northwest's operating profit comes from
flights between the United States and countries in the Pacific
Rim.17 9 In addition, Northwest's freight capacity to Asia
"substantially exceeds" that of any other U.S. carrier.1 8 0 The
airline operates eight Boeing 747s exclusively in the Pacific cargo
market, and it also carries cargo on its passenger flights.' 8 '
Northwest reportedly gets about ten percent of its overall revenue
82
from cargo, a high percentage for a U.S. passenger carrier.1
Besides giving JAL trans-Pacific privileges to enter the United
States,' 8 3 the 1952 agreement also gave JAL beyond rights,
authorizing the airline to land in the United States and fly to a
third nation.' 8 4 JAL has taken advantage of its incumbent status

under the agreement, flying about 130 flights a week to the
United States and Canada.1 8s In 1997, JAL reached a codesharing agreement with American Airlines that called for the two
airlines to cooperate in providing service between the two nations

in the event that a bilateral agreement between the countries was

175.

See id.

176.
As explained by one aviation newsletter, the incumbent carriers "enjoy
long-standing slot preferences at crowded Japanese airports, leaving most other
carriers to fight for scraps among the remaining few flight and capacity openings."
New Coalition, supranote 124.
177.
See Dasburg Senate Testimony, supranote 1. The flight frequency is as
of June 1997. See id. One commentator has said that Northwest's hub at Tokyo's
Narita Airport "funnels flights in and out like Delta does at Atlanta." Goldman,
supra note 117, at 6. The U.S. carrier coming in second in the number of routes
between the two countries has 155 flights a week. See Dasburg Senate Testimony,
supra note 1.
178.
See Hugh Jackson, Progress Made on European-to-Vegas Flights, LAS
VEGAS BUS. PRESS, Oct. 27, 1997, at 1, availablein 1997 WL 9378192.
179.
See Kennedy, supranote 125, at 1D.
180.
Dasburg Senate Testimony, supranote 1.
181.
See id.; Japan, U.S. Wrangle Over Access to Rich Asian Cargo Market,
AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, July 17, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6703481 [hereinafter
Wrangle OverAccess].
182.
See Wrangle OverAccess, supranote 181.
183.
See Japan, U.S. Set to Resolve Aviation Row in Sept., JAPAN TRANSP.
SCAN, July 14, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 8249966 [hereinafter Aviation Row].
184.
See id.
185.
See Japan May Seek Stability As Much As Change in Bilateral Talks,
AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Aug. 14, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6703586 [hereinafter
Bilateral Talks].
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reached. 186 Initial plans called for the two carriers to provide
187
service between Tokyo and Los Angeles.
As for cargo carriers, Federal Express is the largest U.S.
cargo carrier in the Asian market. 188 As of July 1995, Federal
Express and Northwest Airlines together flew sixty-two all-cargo
flights each week between the United States and Japan. 189 Their
Japanese competitors, Nippon Cargo Airways (NCA) and the
passenger carrier JAL, operated only twenty-six weekly flights
between the two countries. 190 Overall, the U.S. carriers control
sixty-two percent of the U.S.-Japan cargo market. 19 1 In addition,
Federal Express and Northwest operate fifty-five weekly flights
beyond Japan to other destinations in Asia. 192
Other agreements between the United States and Japan have
given additional airlines access to the aviation market that serves
the two countries. These agreements were signed in the late
1970s.19 3 Although their routes and numbers of flights are
limited, 19 4 American, Delta, Continental, United Parcel Service,
and Polar Air have rights to serve Japan under these
agreements. 195 Trans World Airlines and U.S. Airways have no
authority to serve Japan directly under any agreement.19 6 One of
the most important agreements was a 1985 pact that gave a
significant number of flights between the United States and
Japan to American, Continental, and Delta in exchange for giving
Nippon Cargo and All Nippon Airways (ANA) limited access to the
U.S. market. 19 7 This agreement granted access only to fly between
the United States and Japan; it did not grant rights to fly from

186.

See Japanese, US Airlines to Tie Up in Passenger Services: Report,

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 31, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13386602.

187. See id.; see also ANA Sees U.S.-Japan Traffic Doubling by 2000; Wants
Quick Fix to Bilateral, ASIAN AVIATION NEWS, Jan. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8303177 (discussing code sharing between ANA and Delta with service between
Osaka and New York City, Portland, Oregon and Honolulu) [hereinafter ANA Quick

Fi-.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See Wrangle Over Access, supranote 181.
See Feldman, supranote 158, at 57.
See id.
See id. at 58.
See id. at 57-58.
See Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supranote 32.

194.

For example, American Airlines as a MOU carrier is prohibited from

operating more than 20 round-trip flights per week. See Crandall House
Testimony, supranote 151. American may serve only Tokyo, and it may do so only
from Dallas/Ft. Worth, Seattle, and San Jose. See id.

195.
196.
197.

See Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supranote 32.
See id.
See Feldman, supra note 158, at 58. Neither ANA nor Nippon had

privileges to fly to the United States under the 1952 agreement. See Aviation Talks
Fail,supra note 119.
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Japan to other destinations in Asia. 198 Japan did not desire more
U.S. competition in their market-even on a limited basis, without
beyond rights. The Japanese government, however, succumbed to
the demands of Nippon Cargo and ANA to help the carriers get at
least limited access to the lucrative U.S. market. 199
ANA's pressure upon the Japanese government has been a
constant factor in aviation negotiations between the United States
and Japan. ANA, the world's ninth largest airline,20 0 is trying to
expand its international base.2 0 1 Paradoxically, ANA plans major
cutbacks in labor costs as it expands because it needs to compete
with more efficient foreign airlines.20 2 ANA relies heavily on its
domestic routes, which account for seventy percent of its
passenger business.2 0 3 In fiscal year 1995, ANA increased its
domestic passenger traffic by a steady five percent, but 2its
04
international traffic increased by more than twenty percent.
The following year, ANA had similar growth, expanding its
international capacity by another twenty-three percent. 20 5 In
1997, the airline predicted that it would6 increase international
20
capacity by another twenty-five percent.
ANA maintains only a five percent share of the U.S.-Japan
aviation market. 20 7 The airline was hoping for "major growth in its
operations to the United States," and its expansion plans were

198. See Booz Allen Study, supranote 126.
199. See Feldman, supranote 158, at 57. For a detailed analysis of ANA and
its relationship with other Japanese airlines, see ARTHUR J. ALEXANDER, CIVIL
AVIATION INTHE U.S. AND JAPAN (Japan Economic Institute Report No. 34A, 1994)
available at <http://www.gwjapan.com/ftp/pub/policy/jei/1994/a-series/090294a.txt>.

200.
201.

SeeANA QuickFix, supranote 187.
See Japan Could Loosen Up on 'Beyond Rights' for All Nippon Access,

May 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8469197. In April 1997,
ANA announced a new five-year plan that called for increasing international
passenger service by sixteen to seventeen percent per year through 2002. See id.
However, these aggressive plans may be altered because just shortly after they
were announced the president of ANA, Seiji Fukatsu, resigned. See All Nippon
Leadership Instability Prompts Questions About Direction of ANA and Open Sides,
WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, May 23, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 8541705. Some aviation
analysts called ANA's international plans "unrealistic". See id.
202. See ANA Profit Slight on Aggressive Expansion, ASIAN AVIATION NEWS,
June 14, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8303288 [hereinafter Aggressive Expansion];
ANA Quick Fix, supranote 187. In addition to cutting labor costs, ANA planned to
increase aircraft utilization by ten percent in the three years through March 1998
as another cost-saving measure. See ANA Wants to Expand More Vigorously
Abroad, ASIAN AVIATION NEWS, Feb. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
AAVN File [hereinafter ANA Wants to Expand].
203. See Aggressive Expansion, supranote 202.
204. See id.
205. See ANA Plans, supra note 174, at 223.
206. See ANA Wants to Expand, supranote 202.
207. See ANA Quick Fix, supranote 187.
ASIAN AVIATION NEWS,
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dependent on the United States and Japan reaching some form of
aviation liberalization agreement. 20 8 ANA was "anxious" to begin

service from Osaka's Kansai Airport to Honolulu, Hawaii and to

cities in the continental United States.2 0 9 To help it take
advantage of any new agreement, ANA instituted an alliance with
Delta Airlines in 1995.210 The plan allows the two airlines to
coordinate flight schedules and recognize each other's frequent
flyer programs.
A. Differing Interpretationsof the 1952 Aviation Agreement
Many disputes between the United States and Japan erupted
in the mid-1990s, fueled by an aggressive public relations war by
those U.S. airlines upset with the way Japan was treating them
under the 1952 agreement. In 1997, Transportation Department
officials, who were in the middle of negotiations, publicly stated
that the failure to reach a consensus on aviation trade policy had
created a "strained relationship" between the two countries. 2 11 Of
particular concern to U.S. airlines and U.S. government officials
was Japan's refusal to approve additional services for incumbent
carriers through Japan to other destinations in Asia. 212
The United States argued, as did aviation experts, that the
1952 agreement clearly imposed a duty on Japan to authorize

208. ANA Plans, supra note 174, at 223. The United States is just one
region in which ANA hopes to expand. As the U.S.-Japan negotiations were
underway, ANA was planning new service to Europe. ANA wanted to begin service
to Frankfurt from Tokyo and to Milan from Osaka. See Aggressive Expansion,
supra note 202. In January 1998, ANA announced a joint flight arrangement with
Germany's Lufthansa in which the two airlines would code-share some flights and

put each other's names on their aircraft. See Japan'sANA to Launch Code-Sharing
Flights with Lufthansa, Dow Jones Intl News Service, Jan. 29, 1998, available in
WESTLAW, DJINS database. In addition, ANA planned to increase service to
London and Vienna from Osaka, and to Paris from Tokyo. See ANA Plans, supra
note 174, at 223; see also ANA Wants to Expand, supra note 202. Other
international expansion included routes from Japan to Delhi, Bombay, Bangkok,
Singapore, Sydney, Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. See Aggressive Expansion,
supra note 202; ANA Plans, supranote 174, at 223; AIVA Wants to Expand, supra
note 202. At present, Hong Kong is becoming ANA's largest international market.
See ANA Plans, supranote 174, at 223.
209. ANA Wants to Expand, supranote 202. ANA is particularly interested in
routes from Japan to San Francisco, Chicago, and Orlando. See ANA Quick Fix,
supranote 187.
210.
See ANA Quick Fix, supra note 187. In order for ANA to receive any
benefit from the agreement, a new agreement must be reached. See id. In 1996,
ANA had planned to start code sharing with Air Canada as well. See Aggressive
Expansion, supranote 202.
211. Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13.
212.
See id.; Asra Q. Nomani, Japan-U.S. Aviation Talks Hit Turbulence,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1997, at 2, availablein 1997 WL-WSJA 11017129.
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such beyond rights when asked by U.S. carriers. 2 13 Japan had
refused to approve flights by United and Northwest Airlines
through Osaka to Jakarta.2 14 As of June 1997, Northwest had
2 15
been trying to get further beyond rights for more than a year.
Furthermore, Japan's government had refused to allow Federal
Express to fly beyond Japan to several Asian destinations since
1993.216 Federal Express had sought permission to fly through
Japan to the Philippines, China, and Indonesia. 2 17 In still other
instances, Japan permitted only short-term authority to fly routes
in which U.S. airlines had sought full approval, such as United's
request for additional Los Angeles to Tokyo flights. 2 18 In yet
another sticking point, the Japanese consistently used their
authority under the 1952 agreement to restrict changes in air
2 19
fares, while the United States routinely allowed for changes.
Although these disagreements could be characterized as
relatively minor, U.S. airlines were concerned because of the
precedent they were setting for future operations. The
disagreements threatened U.S. airline plans to use Japan as a
"launching pad" to serve the growing Asian market.2 20 According
to some U.S. airline officials, Japan's refusal to give limited

beyond rights now seriously threatened airline expansion.2 2 1 To

213.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13; Nomani, supra note 212,
at 2; see also Civil Air Transport Agreement, supranote 6, 4 U.S.T. at 1950.
214.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
215.
See Dasburg Senate Testimony, supranote 1.
216.
See Smith Senate Testimony, supra note 2. According to Federal
Express executives, the cargo airline had no problem with access or beyond rights
from 1989 through 1993. See id. Then, in 1993, the Japanese government
required filings for new rights to be sent to the Ministry of Transport rather than
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See id. According to Federal Express officials, the
Japanese government then "arbitrarily and without notice, refused to permit
FedEx to operate certain schedules authorized by the Air Transport Agreement."
Id. Upon hearing of Japan's actions, House Transportation Committee Chairman
Bud Shuster drafted legislation that would prohibit Japanese carriers from flying
Asian passenger and cargo traffic to the United States through Japan unless U.S.
carrier beyond rights were recognized. Congress, ConciliatorsOn Collision Course
Over Japan as DOT Reviews Policy, 328 AvIATION DAILY 447 (1997), available in
1997 WL 14516356.
217.
See Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supranote 32.
218.
See Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13. The aviation trade
disputes escalated and the United States retaliated and refused to act on a
request by Japan Airlines to provide service between Honolulu and Hiroshima.
See id. Also the United States limited the duration of Japan Airlines' authority to
fly from Sendai to Honolulu. See id.
219.
See James W. Brosnan, Japanese Close to Air Treaty with U.S., COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Oct. 25, 1997, at B3, availablein 1997 WL 14516356.
220. Kennedy, supra note 125, at 1D.
221.
See id.
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U.S. airlines, these beyond rights were "vital" to their Asian
2 22
operations.
The Japan-U.S. aviation disputes of the mid-1990s resulted
from differing views as to the purpose and intent of the 1952
agreement. 22 3 Specifically, Japan interpreted the agreement as
allowing for restrictions on U.S. incumbent carrier access, while
the United States interpreted it as offering unconditional flight
rights. 2 24 Furthermore, Japan saw the agreement as providing an
unfair advantage to U.S. carriers, given the new market
conditions that had developed in the forty years since the
agreement was signed, and complained that the United States
was violating the underlying intentions of the agreement.
United States Department of Transportation officials
recognized that the Japanese considered the agreement unfair but
believed that the Japanese were simply complaining about
competition. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Transportation
Murphy testified before the House Aviation Subcommittee that he
thought Japan's increasingly obstructionist actions were the
result of "a perception on the part of the Japanese that the
existing aviation agreement and related understandings.., are

unfair to Japan and give U.S. carriers more access to Japan's
market than Japanese carriers have to the U.S. market." 225
Murphy said that it was true that since the late 1980s U.S.
carriers had been increasing their market share in the U.S.-Japan
aviation market, but that those gains were the result of more
22 6
efficient operations and not an unfair aviation agreement.
Testifying before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee, Assistant
Secretary of Transportation Hunnicutt echoed Murphy's
comments. Hunnicutt acknowledged that the Japanese perception
is that U.S. carriers "abuse" their flight rights. 2 2 7 But, Hunnicutt
also emphasized that the market share disparity is the result of
the U.S. carriers' ability to compete more efficiently than
22 8
Japanese carriers.
The U.S. carriers' share of the passenger market between the
United States and Japan has risen from about fifty percent to
nearly sixty-six percent over the last decade. 2 29 The United

222. Id.
223.
See generallyJacqueline McFadyen, U.S.-Japan Civil Aviation: Prospects
for Progress (visited June 6, 1997) <http://www.iie.com/97-2.htm> (a working

paper summarizing a Feb. 13, 1997 forum discussion on U.S.-Japan aviation
relations sponsored by the Institute for International Economics).
224.

SeeAviation Row, supranote 183.

225.

Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.

226.

See id.

227.
228.

Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supranote 32.
See id.

229.

See id.
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States was quick to point out that Japan's share in the of the

U.S.-Japan aviation market was roughly equivalent to the current
U.S. share under the same agreement from the 1970s through the
late 1980s. 23 0 According to U.S. officials, U.S. carriers were
reaping the benefits of deregulation, which forced them to become
more efficient in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 2 3 1 U.S. officials
further noted that ANA and JAL had not been forced to respond to
the same competitive pressures because of Japan's tight
2 32
regulation of the industry.
As a result of being protected from competition in the
domestic market, 2 33 both ANA and JAL are "hopelessly inefficient
by American standards. "2 3 4 ANA's operating costs are estimated
to be eighty percent higher than the competing U.S. carriers, and
JAL's are estimated to be about sixty-six percent higher. 23 5 Some
of these higher costs are beyond the carriers' control because they
result from higher fixed costs such as landing charges and fuel
costs. 2 3

6

Other costs are within the airlines' control, 23 7 but until

recently, they have been unwilling to cut these expenditures.

230. See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
231. See Baliles, supra note 13. Congress passed the Airline Deregulation
Act in 1978. See id. The Act gave domestic airlines-and not the government-the
right to choose which routes they would fly, how often they would fly them, and
what fares they would charge. See INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, supra note 15, at 12.
For an in-depth analysis of Japan's regulation of the domestic aviation market,
see

ARTHUR

J.

ALEXANDER,

DOMESTIC

AVIATION

IN

JAPAN:

MARKET

FORCES/REGULATION (Japan Economic Institute Report A, 1996) available at
<http://-vww.gjapan.com/ftp/pub/policy/jei/ 1996/a-series/ 0329-96a.txt>.

232.

The Washington Post, in a blunt editorial staking out the U.S. view,

said that "Japan has resisted fiercely such deregulation, both because it fears for
its long-coddled and relatively inefficient national carrier, Japan Airlines, and
because full deregulation has not, up to now, been Japan's style." Semi-Open
Skies, supranote 24, at A24.
233. Japan did begin some domestic "deregulation" in 1996, which allowed
JAL and ANA to lower their fares to a level that took into account the direct route
expenses. See Japanese Carriers, supra note 101. A Japanese aviation analyst
said that the limited deregulation was designed to stimulate competition and
efficiency in the Japanese airline industry. See id. As a result of the deregulation,
Japanese airlines discounted fares by an estimated forty-five to fifty percent,
according to Shoei Hino of Japan's Civil Aviation Bureau. See id. For a detailed
assessment of the impact on U.S. airlines of domestic deregulation, see
ALEXANDER, supranote 23 1.
234. Risky Take-off. JapaneseAirlines, ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 13361238 [hereinafter Risky Take-of]]. See Japanese Carriers, supra
note 101 (explaining that Japanese airlines may not be able to compete against
their U.S. competitors in a free market).
235. See Risky Take-off, supranote 234.
236. See id.
237. See JapaneseCarriers,supranote 101. Industry analysts estimate that
the Japanese carriers' labor costs are about double that of U.S. and other Asian
carriers. See id. The Japanese airlines did try contracting out some cabin staff,
but it did not lead to significant labor savings. See id.
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At the time of the bilateral negotiations, JAL had already
instituted some measures to become more efficient. JAL was
cutting about $830 million a year from its overhead. 2 38 The airline
had also cut 5,000 jobs since 1989, bringing its workforce down
to 17,000.239 In a unique move for a Japanese company, JAL has
opened maintenance facilities in Singapore and southwest China
to cut costs. 24 In the new facility, JAL can overhaul a Boeing 747
for one-sixth of what it would cost in Japan.2 4 1 Unlike JAL, ANA
has not been able to implement significant cost-cutting measures.
Seiji Fukatsu, the former president of ANA who tried to reform the
company, quit after meeting resistance to efforts to streamline
operations. 2 42 Still, ANA has been able to maintain an operating
profit because a majority of its service is in the high-margin
Japanese domestic market. 24
To protect Japanese-based airlines from U.S. competition,
Japanese officials had steadfastly refused to negotiate a fullfledged open skies agreement with the United States. Hiromichi
Toya, Japan's Vice Transport Minister for International Affairs,
stated his government's aversion to the U.S. position after the
"It is obvious that we cannot
September, 1997 negotiations:
accept any proposal that would commit us to open skies. It would
be difficult to continue talks if we would be forced to accept a
proposal like that."2 44 Instead of open skies, Japan had been
seeking "equality" in any agreement. To the Japanese negotiators,
equality meant that each country should have the same number
245
of carriers with liberal access to each other's market.
Essentially, the Japanese version of equality meant that only two
carriers would have open access to the Japanese market, and in
exchange, both Japanese carriers-ANA and JAL-would have
open access to the U.S. market. 2 46 U.S. negotiators found this
of
Secretary
Assistant
Deputy
unworkable.
approach
Transportation Murphy outlined the U.S. view on Japan's
approach to aviation negotiations: "This approach would
essentially give Japan's international airline industry unrestricted
access to the US market while excluding a major portion of the
24 7
US industry from liberal access to Japan."

238. See Risky Takeoff, supranote 234.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Aviation Pact, supranote 33.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
See id.
Id.
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To the Japanese, the "equality" approach to negotiations
made sense and was reasonable. Japanese officials believed that
the 1952 plan clearly created an "imbalance" in favor of the
United States. 2 48 To the Japanese, the United States had two
airlines with essentially unrestricted access to the Japanese
market, while Japan had only one air carrier with the same rights
2 49
to the U.S. market. To Japan, that did not represent fair trade.
Similarly, Japanese officials felt that changed conditions made
unrestricted U.S. access to the Japanese market unnecessary.
When the 1952 agreement was signed, U.S. carriers flying into
25 0
Asia needed to land in Japan because of their limited range.
Today, however, it is no longer absolutely necessary to land in
Japan because newer planes can make the trans-Pacific flight to
Asia without stopping in Japan to refuel. 25 ' As the Japanese
officials saw it, U.S. carriers wanted access to Japanese airports
not out of geographic necessity, but to exploit the large Japanese
passenger and cargo markets. The Japanese government said that
U.S. carriers, by continuing to use Japanese landing rights in this
manner, "violated the spirit" of the agreement. 2 52 Japanese airline
officials accused U.S. airlines of unfair competition, price
undercutting, and market domination.2 5 3 Japanese sentiment
was that the beyond rights permitted low-cost U.S. airlines to
dominate profitable routes between Japan and other destinations
25 4
in Asia.
In part, the Japanese contentions were true. But whether the
1952 agreement is the cause of the market share imbalance was
not so certain. As JAL Chairman Susumu Yamaji admitted to the
International Aviation Club in 1992, there has been a change in
airline traffic between the two countries with more Japanese than
Americans flying between the two nations. 25 5 When the
agreement was signed in 1952, more than eighty percent of
passengers between the United States and, Japan were from the

248.
See Japan, U.S. Agree on Safety Net for Aviation Deal, JAPAN TRANSP.
SCAN, Oct. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 15608966 [hereinafter Safety Net]. The
Japanese media opined that Japanese negotiators "should continue to assert
[Japan's] views and work to win the understanding of the United States."
Perseveringfor 'Equality in the Sky,' DAILY YOMIURI, Aug. 8, 1997, available in
1997 WL 12800617 [hereinafter Equality in the Sky].
249.
See Safety Net, supranote 248.
250.
See Beyond Rights, supranote 168.
251.
See id.; UAL's Wolf to Japan,AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, July 5, 1993, available
in 1993 WL 2887388 [hereinafter Wolf to Japan].
252.
Wolf to Japan,supranote 251.
253.
See id.
254.
See id.
255.
See JAL Chairman Yamafr Time to Modify Japan-U.S. Bilateral Air
Agreement, AIRLINE FIN. NEWs, Nov. 9, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2251539

[hereinafter JAL ChairmanYamafj].
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United States, but now eighty-five percent of the passengers are
Japanese.2 5 6 Because of the change in traffic, Yamaji said the
1952 bilateral agreement "functions largely in favor of the U.S."
and that there is 'no reason to justify the necessity of such a
large U.S. presence in the Asian markets." 2 57 Although JAL had
the same rights as U.S. carriers to fly through U.S. cities on their
way to third countries, JAL operated only one such route.2 58 U.S.
airline officials argued that U.S. carriers should not lose their
beyond rights simply because they used their rights "more
aggressively" than JAL. 2s 9 JAL countered that the opportunities
beyond the United States were "not financially rewarding," and
that the airline did not necessarily desire to take advantage of
those rights.2 60 To JAL and the Japanese negotiators, it would
have been more advantageous to either restrict or drop beyond
rights altogether rather than deal with U.S. competition in the
261
Asian market.
United States carriers are indeed competing fiercely with
their foreign counterparts in the Asian market. U.S. carriers fly to
more cities in both the United States and Japan than their
Japanese competitors. 2 62 U.S. carriers have twice the number of
flights between the two countries.2 63 And they fly about twothirds of the passenger traffic between the United States and
Japan even though Japanese passengers account for more than
80 percent of those traveling between the two countries.2 64 In
addition, U.S. carriers have far more passengers making use of
265
beyond rights.
Given the state of the market, and the relative inefficiency of
Japanese airlines, it is not hard to understand why the Japanese
argued that open skies would result in some sort of U.S.
"monopolization of routes."2 6 6 The Japanese believed that the

market is so unequal that competition alone cannot account for
the difference in market share.2 6 7 To Japan, the U.S. market

256.
See id.
Id.
257.
See Beyond Rights, supra note 168. JAL flies from Los Angeles to Sao
258.
Paolo, Brazil, to serve a large Japanese community located there. See Wolf to
Japan,supranote 251; Bilateral Talks, supranote 185.
Wolf to Japan,supranote 251.
259.
260.
Id.
See Bilateral Talks, supranote 185 (discussing the greater benefits that
261.
flow to the United States from beyond rights than flow to Japan).
262.
See Equality in the Sky, supranote 248.
263.
See id.
See id.
264.
265.
See id.
Id.
266.
267.
See id.
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share is the direct result of an unfair advantage acquired under
the 1952 agreement. 2 68 Japanese officials are also quick to point
out that "open skies" policy is not completely open because the
United States does69not allow foreign carriers to establish hubs at
2
U.S. destinations.
Because of the U.S. strength in the aviation markets, Japan
felt it was necessary to stand up to the United States in aviation
negotiations. The tension between the two countries had been
building for years. At a 1995 Asian-Pacific industry meeting, JAL's
Director of International Public Relations Geoff Tudor blamed the
United States for aviation tensions around the world: "If you were
to take a sweeping look at the aeropolitical problems affecting the
international civil aviation industry worldwide, you might-after
analysis-realize that a common denominator in many of these
problems was one country-the United States of America." 2 70 The
JAL official went on to say that the U.S. carriers "flagrantly
abused" their beyond traffic rights and that the U.S. airlines "are
resented in Asia, not because they are in the market at all, but
because they are greedy, and take too much."27 1 As negotiations
got underway, Japanese airline officials continued their public
relations campaign against U.S. carriers in an effort to convince
2 72
other countries to join and combat the "America problem."
B. Drawn-OutNegotiationsand Numerous Aborted Takeoffs
The United States and Japan have both sought to renegotiate
the 1952 aviation pact for years. Industry and government

officials for both countries have been discussing the benefits of
crafting a new agreement since 1992.273 In 1993, the fifteenmember Orient Airlines Association recommended that Asian
governments negotiate "fairer agreements which provide a level
playing field" to help Asian carriers who compete against U.S.
airlines.2 7 4 In 1995, specific disputes kick-started aviation
negotiations between the United States and Japan. After Japan
refused to allow Federal Express to expand its service from Japan
to its Philippines hub at Subic Bay, the U.S. government

See id.
268.
See Jackson, supra note 178, at 1. However, it should be noted that
269.
neither the U.S. nor Japan allows foreign airlines to fly between their domestic
destinations. See id.
Warnings, supranote 151, at 327.
270.
Id.
271.
272. James, supranote 95, at 16.
See JAL Chairman Yamaji, supra note 255 (discussing how Japanese
273.
airline officials were seeking to change the 1952 bilateral agreement).
See Wolf'to Japan,supranote 251.
274.
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threatened sanctions.2 7 5 To head off an aviation trade war, the
two parties engaged in negotiations 27 6 and reached a limited
agreement that would allow Federal Express to begin full
operations to the Philippines in exchange for six additional weekly
cargo flights by Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA) and JAL to
Chicago.2 77 Even more importantly, during the cargo negotiations,
the two countries agreed to begin comprehensive talks in
27 8
September 1995 about overhauling the entire 1952 agreement.
Some U.S. airline officials expressed their frustration that the
United States would give in to the Japanese, arguing that it was
Japan, not the United States, that was violating the 1952
agreement. 27 9 Due to the intense criticism concerning the talks
and the difficulty of negotiations, the early discussions focused
28 0
primarily on cargo issues.
As early discussions got underway in 1995, ANA joined those
U.S. carriers locked out of the 1952 bilateral agreement in asking
for a new bilateral pact. 28 1 The primary reason for ANA's interest
was not only to get access to the U.S. market, but also to get
approval for a code-sharing alliance it had signed with Delta
Airlines.2 8 2 In 1996, ANA CEO Seiji Fukatsu reemphasized the
importance of reaching a new agreement and publicly endorsed

275.
See U.S. Sanctions Spark Talk of Bilateral Battle with Japan, WORLD
AIRLINE NEs, June 26, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6155392 [hereinafter
Sanctions Spark Talk]. The U.S. sanctions would have prohibited JAL and Nippon
Cargo Airlines (NCA) from carrying any cargo that did not originate in Japan (for
example, from Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Thailand) on their
scheduled all-cargo services to the United States. See id.
276.
See Wrangle OverAccess, supranote 181.
277.
See JapanU.S.Reach Agreement, FedExBegins Intra-Asia Service Sept.
4, ASIAN AVIATION NEws, July 28, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 6690567 [hereinafter
FedEx Begins Service]; U.S. and Japan Reach Agreement, New Bilateral Talks in
September, AIRLINE FIN. NEws, July 31, 1995, available in 1995 WL 6703523
[hereinafter New Bilateral]. Prior to the authorization of additional flights, the two
Japanese carriers had seven flights a week to Chicago from Tokyo. Fedex Begins
Service, supra.
278.
See FedEx Begins Service, supra note 277; New Bilateral, supra note
277. JAL announced that it was "pleased that a way has been opened to discuss
the revision of the basic air transport agreement itself. We now expect the
Japanese government to make every effort to revise this outdated and unfair
agreement." Id.
279.
See U.S. Should Stiffen 'Timid' Stance in Japan Talks, FedEx Tells
Congress, 323 AVIATION DAILY 425 (1996), available in 1996 WL 2081181
[hereinafter Timid Stance].
280.
See ANA Chief Urges U.S., Japan To Start Passenger Talks, 323 AVIATION
DAILY 91 (1996), available in 1996 WL 2079614 [hereinafter ANA ChieJ].
281.
See ANA Aligns Itself with U.S. Carriers Calling for U.S.-Japan Talks,
WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Dec. 4, 1995, available in 1995 WL 12731857 [hereinafter
ANA Aligns with U.S.].
282.
See id.
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changes that would eliminate different treatment for28incumbent
3
airlines and those not covered by the 1952 agreement.
Cargo negotiations continued between the United States and
Japan into 1996, with passenger issues taking on importance as
the year progressed.2 8 4 By this time, the need to rework the
aviation agreement had made it to the two countries' top decisionmakers. At the U.S.-Japan Summit in Tokyo in the spring of
1996, President Clinton urged Japan's Prime Minister Hashimoto
to embrace open skies and to abide by the 1952 agreement as
negotiations got underway.2 8 5 President Clinton himself was
receiving pressure to get an open skies agreement. In April 1996,
twenty-three members of the U.S. Airports for Better International
Air Service urged Clinton to continue talks with the goal of
achieving open skies. 28 6 The cargo talks concluded in April 1996,
but neither U.S. nor Japanese airlines were completely satisfied
with the results.28 7 Northwest, United, and Federal Express, as
incumbent airlines, each received rights to fly cargo on three
additional routes.28 8 Federal Express also "preserved" its existing
services beyond Japan.2 8 9 United Parcel Service, one of the
airlines allowed to fly into Japan under a memorandum of
understanding, received six additional weekly flights beyond
Osaka carrying Japanese as well as trans-Pacific cargo.2 90 In
exchange, JAL and NCA each got three more cargo routes to the

United States. 291

283. See ANA Chief, supranote 280, at 91.
284. See Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supra note 32; Aviation Talks Fail,
supranote 119.
285. See Dasburg Senate Testimony, supranote 1.
286. See USA-BIAS Seeks U.S.-Japan Talks On Liberalizing Passenger
Service, AIRPORTS, Apr. 23, 1996, at 160, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
AIRPTS File.
287. See UPS Wins in US-Japan CargoRound, But Everybody Got Something,
WORLD AIRLINE NEwS, Apr. 8, 1996, availablein LEXIS, MARKET Library, IACNWS
File [hereinafter CargoRound].
288. See id.
289. Id.
290. See id. Just before gaining its additional routes, UPS had announced a
plan to spend $400 million to construct a hub in Taiwan. See id. In August of
1996, UPS worked on its own and received rights to operate twelve additional
weekly flights between the United States and Osaka and beyond Osaka to two
additional Asian destinations. See Japanese Unmoved By Threat of U.S. Sanctions,
AIR CARGO REP., Aug. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, TRANS Library, AIR File
[hereinafter Japanese Unmoved]. UPS had operated in the market under a joint
venture with Japanese-based Yamato since 1991. See id.
291.
See CargoRound, supranote 287.

1242

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:1207

At the conclusion of the spring 1996 cargo talks, the
negotiators agreed to discuss passenger issues.29 2 Some shortterm talks led to temporary summer service schedule increases
for both United and JAL.2 9 3 But in June, the comprehensive
passenger talks turned acrimonious. The talks deadlocked after
the Japanese refused the United States request to allow United
and Northwest to expand their service to Jakarta through Japan
while the talks continued. 2 9 4 Japan was reportedly considering
renouncing the agreement altogether, but it did not. 2 95 By midJuly 1996, the United States was threatening to impose sanctions
on JAL and NCA after Japan, balking on an earlier agreement,
refused to allow Federal Express to begin its service through
Japan to the Philippines, Indonesia and China. 2 96 As an
explanation, the Japanese government released a prepared
statement by Japanese Minister of Transportation Yoshiyuki
Kamei: "The Japanese Government has been reserving its decision
on applications by a U.S. carrier for new beyond routes based
297
upon the Japanese side's interpretation of these agreements."
After talks broke down in 1996, Transportation Department
officials privately said that negotiations would not continue
2 98
because of election year political pressures.
Formal talks between the two countries began again in
1997.299 In late January 1997, Charles Hunnicutt, the U.S

Assistant

Secretary

of Transportation

for

Aviation

and

International Affairs, put forth the administration negotiation
plans: "We are willing to be pragmatic, as long as we make
progress toward a competitive market."30 0 Essentially, the United
States had given up hope for immediate open skies with Japan
and was ready to push for an agreement that created a transition

292.
See With Service Issues Solved, U.S., Japan to Hold DiscussionsJune 34, 324 AVIATION DAILY 189, May 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
AVDAILY File [hereinafter Service Issues Solved].
293.
See id.
294.
See JapanPoised to Renounce? Airline PassengerTalks Between the US
and Japan,AIRLINE Bus., July 1996, at 8, available in LEXIS, TRANS Library, AIR
File [hereinafter Poisedto Renounce].
295.
See id.
296.
See JapaneseUnmoved, supra note 290.
297.
Id.
298.
See New Coalition,supra note 124.
299.
See Aviation Row, supranote 183.
300.
U.S. SpeakersDebate Way to Open Skies, OAA's Stirland Asks Why Go?,
ASIAN AVIATION NEwS, Feb. 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, NEWS File, AAVN File
[hereinafter Speakers Debate]. Hunnicutt and Alan Larson, the Assistant

Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs led the U.S. negotiating
team. See U.S., Japan Searchfor Common Ground in Tokyo, 329 AVIATION DAILY
207 (1997) [hereinafter Common Ground].
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to open skies within a specific timeframe. 30 1 The United States
also wanted a specific commitment from Japan that it would allow
more access for non-incumbent carriers, such as American,

Delta, and Continental.

30 2

The negotiators met three times during the spring of 1997,
and then met again in July and August with the hopes of
reaching an agreement by September 1997.303 Throughout the

negotiations, the United States sought to resolve the immediate
Federal Express cargo dispute, but the Japanese reportedly "held
the issue 'hostage' to force U.S. concession" on the transition to
open skies. 30 4 In September, the negotiators met again but

reached no agreement. 30 5 Alan Larson, the lead U.S. negotiator,
stressed his continued commitment to open skies: "The question
is how we get there, and I believe there is room for
pragmatism." 30 6 After the September meeting, Larson publicly
announced three U.S. objectives in future discussions: permanent
resolution of the current disputes, substantial liberalization, and
a commitment to "future liberalization."3 0 7 The September
meetings focused on a four-year agreement.3 08 During the
September 1997 meetings, Japanese negotiators refused to accept
a full transition to open skies, so the United States retreated
"from its original position" and proposed that both sides agree to a
four-year deal with a transition to open skies when the interim

301.
See Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supra note 32; Murphy House
Testimony, supranote 13; Speakers Debate, supranote 300.
302.
See Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13.
303.
See Aviation Row, supra note 183. The negotiations were held in
various locations throughout the year. The July meeting was held in Portland,
Oregon, and the August meeting was held in Washington, D.C. See Negotiators
Retrace Gulf as U.S., Japan Partisans Continue Pressure, 329 AVIATION DAILY 367
(1997); NegotiatorsSee Path to U.S.-JapanBilatera4 Aim for September Signing, 329
AVIATION DAILY 61 (1997). In September, the negotiations moved across the Pacific
to Tokyo. See Hanyu, Larson Meet Informally in Attempt to Avoid U.S.-Japan

Impasse, 329 AVIATION DAILY 395 (1997).
304. Aviation Row, supranote 183. In July, Japan was reportedly willing to
give Federal Express additional cargo rights, but this did not come to pass
because Japan wanted the United States to accept less than an open skies
arrangement in exchange. See id. The Japanese concession would have allowed
Federal Express to carry Japanese cargo to other Asian destinations as long as it
made up no more than fifty percent of the total revenues per flight-as opposed to
a fifty percent limit on cargo weight under the current agreement. See id. Under
this proposal, Federal Express would have been able to increase shipping from
Japan into Asia because the revenues per flight from the United States to Asia are
much greater than from Japan to other Asian markets. See id.
305.
See Nomani, supra note 212, at 2.
306. Kennedy, supranote 125, at 1D.
307.
USIS-Japan/US Civil Aviation Talks Extended, ASIA PULSE, Sept. 30,
1997, availablein 1997 WL 13565137.
308.
See Nomani, supra note 212, at 2.
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deal expired. 30 9 This four-year transition to open skies was not
accepted outright, and the two nations failed to reach an
agreement on whether open skies would ever be implemented.
Other sticking points in the September 1996 meetings

included the availability of takeoff and landings slots at Japanese
airports for U.S. carriers, the extent to which U.S. carriers would
be allowed to fly through Japan to other Asian destinations, and
whether code-sharing agreements would be allowed between
Japanese and U.S. airlines.3 10 Beyond rights presented a
obstacle during the September
particularly formidable
negotiations. Japan sought to restrict the number of U.S. flights
that passed through Japan to third countries, but the United
beyond rights were already
States held firm, stressing that
311
allowed in the 1952 agreement.
However, progress was made on one front. Absent open skies,
the United States sought one hundred more flights per week into
Japan for U.S. carriers. 3 12 Japan was willing to provide seventy
additional weekly flights to Japan and grant Federal Express'
request to fly from Japan to other Asian destinations. 3 13 Still, no
U.S.
agreement was reached, and Federal Express and the other3 14
airlines were unable to take advantage of any greater access.
Following some preliminary meetings, high-level negotiations
followed in late October of 1997.315 U.S. negotiators continued
their efforts to create a "trigger mechanism" that would require
Japan to come back the bargaining table after any interim
agreement expired. 3 16 The United States was concerned that once
ANA was given access to the U.S. market under an interim deal,
3 17
Japan would have no reason to return to the bargaining table.
Still, the United States was willing to negotiate away the trigger
mechanism. Absent a formal trigger in the deal, the United States
wanted Japan to allow for twenty additional weekly flights (in

309.

Aviation Pact, supranote 33.

310.
311.
312.

See Nomani, supranote 212, at 2.
See Aviation Pact, supranote 33.
See Aviation Talks Fail,supranote 119.

313. See Treaty to Open U.S.-Japan Air Traffic, PAc. Bus. NEWS (Honolulu,
Haw.), Sept. 29, 1997, at 32, available in 1997 WL 12191546 [hereinafter Air
Traffic].
314. See Nomani, supra note 212, at 12. Federal Express was particularly
disadvantaged by the lack of agreements because it needed the pact completed by
September, 1996 so it could begin its planned 1997 service expansion to China
and other Asian markets. See id.
315.

See Aviation Pact, supra note 33; Aviation Talks Fail, supra note 119;

Japan, U.S. Eye 4-Year Deal As Aviation Talks Resume, JAPAN TRANSP. SCAN, Oct.

27, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 15608964 [hereinafter Aviation Talks Resume].
316. Risky Takeoff, supranote 234.
317.
See Safety Net, supranote 248.
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addition to the seventy that Japan had suggested in the
September negotiations). The United States also wanted Japan to
provide access to one or two more U.S. airlines.3 18 If Japan was
willing to agree to the additional flights, any agreement would
reportedly have used phrases such as "full liberalization," but
without formalizing a commitment from Japan for full-fledged
open skies.3 19 However, the October discussions became bogged
down, and the United States threatened to impose sanctions on
Japan if aviation talks did not reach an agreement.3 2 0 U.S.
negotiators were hoping to push the Japanese into a completed
agreement by the November, 1997 Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum in Canada, and if not then, at least by year's
3 21

end.

Negotiators met again in November,3 22 but they agreed only

to talk further. To encourage substantive negotiations, the United
States withdrew its threat of sanctions at the beginning of the

November talks.3 2 3 An Asian currency crisis only made the
November negotiations even more difficult. As domestic
passengers curbed their travel because of tight financial times,
Japan's airlines and the Japanese negotiators became

increasingly wary of allowing more competition.3 2 4 December

talks in Tokyo made some headway when the Japanese agreed to
increased takeoff and landing slots for U.S. carriers at Tokyo's
Narita Airport.3 25 Japanese negotiators had earlier refused U.S.

demands for more slots saying that the airports were running at
full capacity.3 2 6 Although they could not create more space, the
Japanese increased the allocation by allowing more flights to be
jointly operated by U.S. and Japanese carriers.3 27 Despite this
progress, the larger issue of increasing the number of flights and

318.
See Risky Takeoff, supranote 234; Safety Net, supranote 248.
319. Aviation Talks Resume, supranote 315; see Safety Net, supranote 248.
320.
See U.S. Rescinds Threat of Sanctions Against Japan, Japan Econ.
Newswire, Nov. 15, 1997, available in WESTLAW, JWIRE database [hereinafter
U.S. Rescinds Threat].
See Brosnan, supranote 219, at B3; Kohei Murayama, U.S. Tables New
321.
Proposals on Aviation Talks uith Japan, Japan Econ. Newswire, Nov. 8i 1997,
available in WESTLAW, JWIRE database; No Deal, supranote 37.
See U.S., Japan to Meet for Fifth Round of Aviation Talks, STAR-TRIB.
322.
(Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Nov. 13, 1997, at 1D, available in 1997 WL
7589982 [hereinafter Fifth Round]. The November talks were held in San
Francisco. See US Hopes to Build on "IncrementalProgress"in Air Talks with Japan,
AGENCE FRANcE-PREsSE, Nov. 12, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 13432973.
See U.S. Rescinds Threat, supranote 320.
323.
See Fifth Round, supranote 322, at 1D.
324.
325.
See Japan Approves More Slots in Tokyo for U.S. Airlines, JAPAN TRANSp.
ScAN, Dec. 22, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 15609121.
326.
See id.
327.
See id.
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routes for U.S. carriers into Japan remained unresolved. 328 More
negotiations were planned for January, 1998.329 Those
330
negotiations successfully led to an agreement.
1. U.S. Airlines Divided Over Goals of Talks
U.S. negotiators not only had to walk through the Japanese
trade negotiation minefield, but they also had to avoid friendly fire
from a sharply divided U.S. airline industry that sought different
results from the aviation negotiations.3 3 1 The airline coalitions
were at first divided between those passenger carriers with
incumbent rights to the Japanese market (United and Northwest)
and those that did not enjoy liberal access to the Japanese
market (American, Delta, Continental, and Trans World). The
incumbents wanted nothing less than open skies, and they feared
that any compromise might leave them with less access than they
currently had under the 1952 agreement. 33 2 The latter group
wanted the U.S. government to pursue a middle ground
agreement that would provide further access to the market to
more U.S. carriers regardless of whether or not it would be
equivalent to open skies. 3 33 Transportation Department officials,
in reacting to the split within the industry, poignantly illustrated
their desire to appease both domestic camps: "[W]e share.., a

recognition of the need for greater access... [a]t the same time,
we will continue our longstanding efforts to work with Japan to
ensure that U.S. rights under the bilateral [agreement]... are
"3 3 4
appropriately recognized.
The domestic carriers split into various coalitions, with each
camp launching multi-million dollar advertising campaigns aimed
at influencing the talks.3 3 5 In February of 1996, the non-

328.
329.
330.
331.

See id.
See id.
See infraPartV.
The travel industry press reported the talks were failing in part

"because of the difficult position in which U.S. negotiators find themselves as the
airlines pit themselves against one another." Yen for Japan, supra note 122, at
112.
332. See United Airlines Blasts Rivals' Japan Coalition, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS,
Feb. 26, 1996, availablein 1997 WL 8067357 [hereinafter United Airlines].
333. See ACCESS U.S.-JAPAN. Statement of Purpose, (visited Jan. 4, 1998)
<http://accessusjapan.org/bi/mission.html> [hereinafter Statement of Purpose].

334.
335.

United Airlines, supranote 332.
See Dori Meinert, No Deal Yet on Open Skies Dispute IncreasedFlights

Between U.S., Japan Subject of Talks, PEORIA J. STAR, Oct. 25, 1997, at A10,

available in 1997 WL 7680706; No Deal, supranote 37. Northwest Airlines, whose
newspaper ad campaign was perhaps the most extensive, reportedly paid as
much as $70,000 per advertisement. See United's Willingness to Settle for Less
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incumbent airlines officially formed an advocacy coalition named
Aviation Coalition for Competition and Expanded Services
3 36
Between the United States and Japan (ACCESS U.S.-Japan).
Gerald Baliles, the former Virginia Governor and ex-Chairman of
the National Airline Commission, headed the group.3 3 7 The
coalition claimed to represent more than two thousand consumer
and tourism
policy organizations,
corporations,
airlines
(American, Delta, Continental, and Trans World), labor groups
and business associations, as well as cities and local officials. 33 8
The group's policy statement provided that the coalition was
3 39
formed to increase aviation traffic between the two countries.
ACCESS U.S.-Japan announced that it wanted to "expand air
service on routes . . . while preserving beyond rights currently
3 40
being exercised by U.S. carriers."

Northwest and United both stressed that the United States
should settle for nothing less than open skies. 3 4 1 Northwest CEO
John Dasburg told the U.S. Senate that "[ilt would be a trade
mistake of colossal proportions" if the United States negotiated an
agreement that compromised on U.S. beyond rights and "let our
carriers be relegated to the future role of transpacific feeder
service for the Japanese carriers serving the rest of Asia."3 42
Dasburg said that Japan would eventually accept open skies only
if the United States stood its ground in negotiations. Northwest
Airlines presented its case to the American Bar Association's
Forum on Air and Space Law in February of 1997, s 4 arguing that
Japan would, in time, accept open skies because: 1) like all other
nations, it was under the pressure of economic globalization; 2) to
compete in the future, Japanese airlines would be forced to work

than 'Open Skies' Could Break Impasse in U.S.-Japan Talks, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS,
June 16, 1997, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, AIRFIN File.
336.
See Dasburg Senate Testimony, supra note 1; New Coalition, supra
note 124; United Airlines, supranote 332.
337.
See New Coalition, supra note 124. Baliles was appointed by President
Clinton to chair the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline
Industry. See id.; see also Baliles, supranote 13.
338.
See Baliles Senate Testimony, supra note 13; New Aviation Agreement
Could Mean $10.8 Billion and 3,600 New Flights for the United States to Japan,
U.S. Newswire, Sept. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13912629 [hereinafter New
Aviation Agreement]; New Coalition, supra note 124. For a more detailed list of
ACCESS U.S.-Japan members, see A CoalitionProfile of ACCESS U.S.-Japan, (visited
Jan. 4,
1998)
<http://www.accessusjapan.org/bi/proffie.html>
[hereinafter

Coalition Profile].
339. See New Aviation Agreement, supra note 338; Statement of Purpose,
supranote 333.
340. United Airlines, supranote 332.
341. See Speakers Debate, supranote 300.
342. Dasburg Senate Testimony, supranote 1.
343. See Speakers Debate, supranote 300.
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within the global network; 3) for each Japanese carrier to have a
global network, it must cooperate with a U.S. carrier; 4) to have a
meaningful U.S. partnership, it must have U.S. antitrust
immunity; and 5) for antitrust immunity, the United States can
require open skies. 344 Richard Hirst, a Northwest senior vice
president, stated the airline's belief that U.S. market dominance
also gave the United States leverage in the talks: "we have the
luxury of being Japanese in negotiations, having something they
3 45
want and are willing to pay for."
In the summer of 1997, United Airlines defected from the
Northwest camp and joined supporters of an interim agreement
that would partially open access to the Japanese market. 3 46 While
speaking before a House committee along with officials from
Northwest, United executives said it was time to adopt "more
modest objectives." 3 47 United announced that it was now seeking
a "result-oriented" strategy that would allow for code-sharing and
other airline alliances. 3 48 Just four months earlier, United had
joined Northwest in condemning ACCESS U.S.-Japan and its
objectives. 3 49 At the time, United was concerned that those
airlines with partnership agreements in the works were willing to
negotiate away the incumbents' existing beyond rights. 35 0 But
when the September negotiations concluded, there was no
question of United's unequivocal support for a middle-ground
35 1
agreement.
While United and the non-incumbent airlines were pleased
with the way discussions were proceeding in September of 1997,
Northwest argued that the United States had "totally squandered

344. See id.
345.
Id.
346.
See Nancy Dunne, US Airlines Diverge on Asian Open Skies Strategy,
FIN. TImEs (United States), June 13, 1997, at 7, available in 1997 WL 11034659
[hereinafter US Airlines Diverge].
347. Id.
348. Id.
349.
See United Airlines, supranote 332.

350. See id. United General Counsel Stuart Oran attacked the nonincumbent group by saying that it's "nothing more than a smokescreen created by
American and Delta to obtain new rights ...."Id. In the spring of 1996, United's
General Counsel criticized the group as being counterproductive to U.S. interests:
"Access appears willing to give away existing U.S. rights to participate over the
next several decades in the growing Asia market-an existing right worth tens of

billions of dollars-so that a handful of U.S. carriers may achieve their parochial
goals of obtaining a few new flights to Japanese cities." Id.
351. United Senior Vice President Cyril Murphy told the Wall Street Journal
that if the details discussed in September negotiations were to be agreed to it
would be an "historic event" because it would be the first liberalization of the
Japanese aviation market in four decades. Nomani & Blackmon, supra note 151,
at A3.
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the leverage that it had to get a fully open skies agreement" and
that it was "giving up a golden opportunity."3 5 2 Northwest stated
that if an agreement were reached incorporating the details of the
September discussions the United States would never get the
Japanese back to the negotiating table. 35 3 Northwest cited a study
it commissioned from GKMG consulting services in Washington,
D.C. that concluded if the United States settled for less than open
skies the Japanese airlines would enjoy most of the benefits of the
agreement.3 s 4 The GKMG study found that the U.S. share of the
U.S.-Japan aviation market would drop from almost sixty-five
percent to fifty-four percent by 2001.3 s s Furthermore, a
Northwest executive publicly accused American and United of
"selling out" in return for alliances with Japanese airlines and
3s6
being "bought off' by Japan.
Contrary to the position of Northwest Airlines, the nonincumbent airline coalition rallied behind the interim deal being
considered by negotiators. The possibility of 70 additional weekly
flights-3600 each year-tantalized the coalition airlines. ACCESS
U.S.-Japan estimated that the additional flights would produce
about $10.8 billion in additional annual economic activity.3 s 7 The
group claimed that the new flights would create about 250,000
new jobs and bring service to ten new U.S. cities.3 5 8 Based on
these estimates, the coalition found it incredible that, despite the
significant value of this potential agreement, one U.S. airline-the
airline with the largest current share of the U.S.-Japan marketis still mounting vigorous opposition to this type of agreement; an
agreement that would provide more flights by more airlines to
more cities between the U.S. and Japan, and beyond.3 5 9 The
coalition leader, Gerald Baliles, publicly accused Northwest of
3 60
trying to "scuttle" the agreement because it feared competition.
Specifically, he told aviation reporters that "it would be an

352.
353.

Id.
See id.

354.
See Yen for Japan,supranote 122, at 112. The study concluded that if
the agreement created less than open skies, the Japanese would be able to
completely reverse their trade deficit with the United States. See id. According to
GKMG, Japan would erase $2.1 billion of the projected $6.4 billion trade surplus
with Japan in the year 2001. See Kennedy, supranote 125, at 1D.
355.
See Kennedy, supra note 125, at 1D.
356. Jennifer Loven, The Complex Dispute between the United States ... , AP,
Oct. 20, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 2556228.
357.
See New Aviation Agreement, supranote 338.
358.
See id
359.
Id.
360. Greg Gordon, Northwest Sees Problems in Talks on Japan Flights, STARTRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 25, 1997, at 2D, available in 1997 WL
7583460.
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enormous mistake to allow Northwest to continue
361
competition out."

to keep

2. U.S. Communities Apply Political Pressure
As a group, U.S. airlines impact every geographical area in
the United States. Because of the incumbent airlines' use of the
"hub and spoke" system, those regions without a Northwest or
United hub lacked direct access to the Japanese and Asian
markets.3 6 2 States in the Southwest lacked aviation access to
Japan, 3 63 and cities such as Orlando, Cincinnati, Miami, St.
Louis, Salt Lake City, and Boston were excluded from direct
access. 3 64 Only one of every five weekly flights between the United
States and Japan originated east of the Mississippi River, even
though one of every three Americans lives in the eastern United
States. 365 More than forty states have trade offices in Tokyo, but
only twelve U.S. cities have non-stop service to Japan. 3 66 In
contrast, fourteen U.S. cities have non-stop flights to Paris, fifteen
to Frankfurt, and twenty-two to London.3 6 7
The hub system also results in a large concentration of
airline employees who reside around the busiest regional U.S.
airports. 36 8 This creates a significant economic impact on those
communities. Predictably, both Northwest and the non-incumbent
coalition used their economic powers in their major markets to
influence political leaders who might pressure U.S. negotiators.
Northwest has major hubs in Minneapolis and Detroit, and it
focused its political power on the congressional delegations from
Minnesota and Michigan. At Northwest Airlines' request, eleven
senators and thirty-two members of the U.S. House of

361.
Close to Agreement, supranote 5. The executives of the non-incumbent
carriers joined in railing against Northwest's refusal to back down from absolute
open skies. American Airlines Chairman Robert Crandall claimed that Northwest's
real intention was not free aviation trade, but keeping the status quo. See US
Airlines Diverge, supra note 346, at 7. Scott Yohe, Delta's Senior Vice President of
government affairs concurred with Crandall and said that Northwest "fears new
competition and seeks to protect its own dominant position." Delta Urges U.S.
Negotiators to Conclude a New Agreement with Japan, M2 Presswire, Sept. 29,
1997, availablein 1997 WL 14464422.

362.
at 6.
363.
364.

365.

366.
367.

See Loney House Testimony, supranote 42; Goldman, supra note 117,
See Goldman, supranote 117, at 6.
See Statement of Purpose,supranote 333.

See Loney House Testimony, supranote 42.
See Crandall House Testimony, supranote 151.

See id.

368. The U.S. airline industry has a powerful political asset in its
employment roll of more than 600,000 workers worldwide, most of whom are
based in the United States. See Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13.
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Representatives-including every member of the Minnesota and
Michigan delegations-wrote the Clinton administration in 1996
urging U.S. negotiators to stand firm and protect the beyond
rights that were part of the 1952 agreement. 3 69 The governors of
California,
Indiana,
Michigan,
Minnesota,
Tennessee,
Washington, and Wisconsin also wrote the President asking him
to negotiate an open skies agreement. 3 70 In another letter to
President Clinton in 1997, Senators Rod Grams, Jesse Helms,
and Spencer Abraham argued that any agreement short of open
skies would widen the trade deficit and erode confidence in the
President's free trade policies. 3 7 1 By September of 1997, nine
powerful congressional committee chairman backed Northwest's
stance that open skies should be the U.S. negotiators' only
3 72
option.
Detroit mobilized its business community after learning that
Northwest could lose some flights to Japan under an interim
aviation agreement. Detroit is Northwest's largest hub worldwide,
and it is in the midst of a $1 billion terminal expansion to
accommodate the airline's growth.3 7 3 Detroit's community leaders
were concerned about the impact any route losses would have on
the local economy. Community leaders estimated that $1.5 billion
in local economic benefits accrued annually due to Northwest's
Asian routes through Detroit.3 74 At the time of negotiations,
Northwest flew twice daily to Tokyo and Osaka and three times
each week to Beijing and Seoul from Detroit.3 75 Nearly sixty
percent of passengers traveling to Japan from Detroit are using
37 6
Japan as a layover while flying to other Asian destinations.
More than twenty Detroit business leaders wrote to President

369.
370.
371.

See Service Issues Solved, supranote 292, at 189.
See id.
See Gordon, supranote 360, at 2D. Both Senator Grams (of Minnesota)

and Senator Abraham (of Michigan) have a large constituency of Northwest
workers in their states. Sen. Helms became involved in his role as Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations committee. See Japan Waits to be Tested on
Liberalization,328 AVIATION DAILY 425 (1997) [hereinafter Japan Waits].
372.

See Nancy Dunne, Ships, Glass and Open Skies Keep U.S.-Japan Trade

Friction Going, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 23, 1997, at 4, available in 1997 WL

14788031. Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee,
sent a letter to the President in September 1997 saying that if the United States
failed to insist on open skies it would send a message embracing protectionism
that would "resound throughout Asia." Larson Reachesfor Sept. 30 Agreement as
Lobbying Continues, 329 AVIATION DAILY 509 (1997).
373.
See Stopa, supranote 1, at 40.

374. See id. Detroit airport officials estimate that each international flight
contributes about $1 million to the metropolitan Detroit economy. See id.
375. See id.
376. See id.
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3 77
Clinton asking the administration to negotiate only open skies.
Notably, Chrysler Chairman Robert Eaton, speaking for the "big
three" automakers wrote to President Clinton and urged him to
stand firm on open skies because of his concern over the trade
3 78

deficit.
Despite the significant political support mustered by
Northwest Airlines, the other U.S. airlines were careful to exercise
their political power, particularly through the ACCESS U.S.-

Japan coalition.3 7 9 American Airlines has a major presence in

Texas, home to the Majority Leader and the Majority Whip in the
U.S.

House

of

3 80

Representatives.

important to the state of Georgia,

Delta's

operations

are

the home of Speaker of the

House Newt Gingrich.3 8 1 Trans World Airlines is based in St.
Louis, Missouri, the home state of House Minority Leader Richard
Gephardt.3 8 2 And United's presence in Chicago brought the large
3 3
Illinois delegation into the political battle. 8
Chicago-area business leaders formed their own advocacy

group in hopes of increasing the number of flights between
Chicago and Japan. The group, called the Midwest-Asia Aviation
Coalition, was led by Bob Michel, the former Republican leader in
the U.S. House of Representatives.3 8 4 The group directly aligned

itself with the non-incumbent airlines and stressed that "progress
should not be stalled by all-or-nothing insistence on complete

deregulation."3 8 5 The coalition, which had the support of both
Illinois Governor Jim Edgar and Chicago Mayor Richard Daley,

377.
See id.
378.
See Kennedy, supranote 125, at ID.
379. According to ACCESS U.S.-Japan, the following members of Congress
sent letters to President Clinton urging him to negotiate and expand passenger
House Speaker New Gingrich, House Democratic Leader
access to Japan:
Richard Gephardt, House Republican Leader Dick Armey, and Senators Robert
Bennett, John Breaux, Richard Bryan, William Cohen, Paul Coverdell, Mike
DeWine, Wendell Ford, Phil Gramm, Orrin Hatch, Fritz Hollings, Kay Bailey
Hutchinson, Edward Kennedy, John Kerry, Frank Lautenberg, Connie Mack,
Mitch McConnell, and Sam Nunn. See CoalitionProfile, supranote 338.
380.
See Kennedy, supranote 125, at ID.
381.
See id.

382.

See Christopher Carey, Treaty Clears TWA for Return to Japan, ST.

Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 1998, at 28, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
SLPD File. If an aviation agreement gives TWA rights into Japan, it was
anticipated that it would bring $500 million in economic benefits into the St.
Louis region annually. See id.
See United Airlines Applauds New Aviation Agreement, PR Newswire,
383.
Jan. 30, 1998, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, PRNEWS File [hereinafter United
Applauds]. United Airlines expressed its thanks to Illinois Senators Dick Durbin
and Carol Moseley-Braun for their help in pressuring the administration to
complete the deal. See id.
384.
See Field, supranote 27, at 4B.
385. Id.
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was created to "do battle" with Northwest Airlines and pursue a

middle-ground
agreement if open skies could not be agreed
86

upon.3
Dennis Whetstone, President of the Illinois Chamber of
Commerce, said that, to the members of the Midwest Coalition,
any agreement was "an economic development issue" and any
new route would open "a lot more doors than we've ever had in
the Midwest to attract a more diverse investment base."3 8 7
Whetstone said that dozens of Japanese companies could locate
manufacturing plants in Illinois if the aviation routes gave them
access to the Chicago area.3 8 8 Another Illinois Chamber of
Commerce member said that the group would like to see an open
skies agreement, but that strategically, the group thought any
opening of skies was better than no agreement because of
endlessly stalled negotiations.3 8 9 According to supporters of the
Midwest Coalition, an agreement could mean millions of dollars
for the Chicago area. An Arthur Anderson study completed for the
Midwest coalition concluded that lifting nonstop restrictions
between Chicago and Japan could create more than 2,600 jobs in
the region 0and have an economic impact of up to $80 million
39
annually.
Other airlines and cities placed their own spin on whether an
interim agreement would benefit their interests. The Dallas
Morning News editorialized about Northwest's stance: "One
cannot blame Minnesota-based Northwest Airlines for fighting
hard to maintain its privileged position. But what's good for one
U.S. carrier is not always good for the country."3 9 1 The Dallas
newspaper noted that the 1952 aviation agreement prevented the
Ft. Worth-based American Airlines from expanding its service to
the Asian market, and that under the interim agreement under
discussion at least one additional weekly flight to Japan could
depart from the Dallas-Ft. Worth airport.3 92 The newspaper
extrapolated data from an ACCESS U.S.-Japan report and
concluded that under an interim agreement the Texas economy
39 3
would benefit by $503 million annually.

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Meinert, supranote 335, atAl0.
Loven, supra note 356.
See id.
See Meinert, supranote 335, at A10.
See id.; Loven, supranote 356.
Air Bridge to Japan: U.S. Negotiator Should Press for Good Agreement,

DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 25, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 11523980.
392. See id.
393.

See id.
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V. UNITED STATES AND JAPAN REACH FOUR-YEAR
LIBERALIZATION AGREEMENT

In January, 1998, the United States and Japan reached a

compromise four-year framework agreement. 394 The agreement
represented a middle-ground approach, giving both U.S. and

Japanese carriers more access to each other's market-without
the adoption of open skies. President Clinton praised the terms of
the agreement, and U.S. Secretary of Transportation Rodney
Slater called the pact a "dramatic step forward."3 9 5 The U.S.
government estimates that the agreement will generate $4 billion
in additional revenue for U.S. carriers over the four years of the

pact.39 6 In addition, the government claims consumers will save
$1.2 billion under the terms of the agreement, 3 9 7 but officials
398
declined to estimate how much the pact would reduce fares.

U.S. airline response to the agreement was mixed. Northwest
called the agreement "disappointing," but also said that it was a
"substantial improvement over what Japan had been seeking to
impose on the U.S ......
399 Northwest noted that it was pleased that
the agreement protected its beyond rights, allowed it to keep its

landing and takeoff rights, and permitted its partnership agreement
with Continental. 4 0° United Chairman Gerald Greenwald called the
agreement a historic breakthrough. 4 °

1

Delta executives called the

agreement a "good start," but expressed concerns about acquiring
the landing and takeoff slots it

needed. 40

2

Both JAL and ANA

expressed concern that the agreement would "herald an era of

394.
See Kohei Murayama, Japan, U.S. Strikes Civil Aviation Accord, Japan
Economic Newswire, Jan. 30, 1998, available in WESTLAW, JWIRE database
[hereinafter Civil Aviation Accord]. The agreement has not yet been drafted into a
final form for high-level signature. See id.
395.
Henry Chu, U.S., Japan Reach Pact to Broaden Air Access
Transportation,L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at Al, availablein 1998 WL 2393929.
396.
See id.; Matthew L. Wald, U.S., Japan to Remove Air-Traffic Restrictions,
New York Times News Service, Jan. 31, 1998, available in 1998 WL-NYT
9803102600.
397.
See Chu, supranote 395, at Al; Wald, supranote 396.
398.
See Wald, supra note 396. Clinton administration officials acknowledged
that the Japanese government would still regulate ticket prices, but they added that
Japan has agreed to consider a partial deregulation in the future when it considers
deregulating domestic fares. See id399. Northwest Reacts to U.S.-Japan Agreement, PR Newswire, Jan. 30,
1998, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, PRNEWS file [hereinafter Northwest
Reacts].
400.
See id.
401.
See United Applauds, supranote 383.
402.
Tony Kennedy, NWA Plans Japan-TaiwanRoute, Using Rights in New
Aviation Deal STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Feb. 11, 1998, at 1D,
available in 1998 WL 6341373.
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cutthroat competition." 40 3 JAL President Akira Kondo called the
agreement a "big disappointment,"4 ° 4 saying that it gave more
benefits to U.S. carriers than to Japanese airlines. 40 5
A. The Four-YearDeal as a Transition
The final January, 1998 agreement was a four-year
transitional pact. 40 6 As early as September, 1997, negotiators
anticipated that the agreement would take the short-term
form. 4 0 7 Aviation analysts expected that U.S. officials would agree
to such a transition because it would allow them to "proclaim it
40 8
as a breakthrough" that moved Japan closer to open skies.
Perhaps the most important provision in the agreement permitted
non-incumbent U.S. carriers to provide ninety new flights a week
from the United States to Japan. 40 9 Of the ninety new flights,
twenty-eight round-trips are to the high-demand Narita Airport in
Tokyo. 4 10 When the ninety additional flights a week for nonincumbents are added to additional flights expected from
incumbent U.S. airlines, more than five thousand new flights will
41
be available each year between the United States and Japan.
Surprisingly, the agreement also provided for more U.S.
carriers to fly to Japan as non-incumbent airlines. The agreement
allows one additional non-incumbent carrier to service Japan
immediately, with a second non-incumbent to enter the market in
2000.412 Trans World Airlines and U.S. Airways are expected to

403. Japan's Airlines See Price War on the Horizon, Japan Economic
Newswire, Jan. 31, 1998, available in WESTLAW, JWIRE database [hereinafter

Price Wadi.
404.
405.
Jones Intl
406.

Chu, supra note 394, at Al.
See id.; JapanAirlines Unhappy with New U.S.-JapanAviation Pact, Dow
News Service, Jan. 31, 1998, available in WESTLAW, DJINS database.
See Civil Aviation Accord, supranote 394.

407.

See Nomani & Blackmon, supranote 151, at A3.

408.

Risky Takeoff, supranote 234.

409.
See Wald, supra note 396. It was widely reported in the fall of 1997
that non-incumbent carriers would be given only 70 additional flights. See Loven,
supra note 356; Nomani & Blackmon, supra note 151, at A3.
410.
See Civil Aviation Accord, supra note 394. Although Narita Airport does
not have any additional landing and takeoff slots, the additional flights will use
twenty eight slots (fourteen round-trips) currently unused by Federal Express.

See id. Another twenty-eight slots will come from Japanese carriers who codeshare with U.S. carriers. See id.
411.
See U.S. Carriers Welcome Aviation Accord, Eye New Flights, Japan
Economic Newswire, Jan. 31, 1998, available in WESTLAW, JWIRE database
[hereinafter New Flights].
412.
See Kohei Murayama, Japan,U.S. Resolve Key Issues in Aviation Talks,
Japan Economic Newswire, Jan 25, 1998, available in WESTLAW, JWIRE
database [hereinafter Key Issues].
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receive the non-incumbent slots.4 13 If TWA gets the rights to serve
Japan, it plans to begin flights to Tokyo from St. Louis in late
1999.414
As part of the agreement, ANA receives incumbent status and
4 15
ANA's
is given unlimited authority to fly into the U.S. market.
6
41
However,
expected early in negotiations.

incumbent status was

somewhat unexpectedly, Japan Air System (JAS) was also given
4 17
Although ANA had aggressively sought
incumbent status.

incumbent status so that it could serve the United States,
aviation analysts have called it a "pyrrhic" victory because ANA
4 18
In
has traditionally lost money on its international routes.
ANA to expand it must purchase new aircraft, which
addition,4for
is costly. 19
1. U.S. Carrier Beyond Rights
The 1998 pact also guaranteed incumbent carriers the same
rights they had acquired under the 1952 agreement. 4 20 All the
U.S. incumbent carriers considered the beyond rights as too
valuable to be traded away in negotiations. 4 2 1 The beyond rights
are important to U.S. carriers because Japanese destinations
alone do not always fill capacity; passengers flying beyond Japan
are needed to fill trans-Pacific flights. 4 22 The protection of beyond
rights was particularly good news for Federal Express, which had
sought beyond rights but had been rebuffed by Japanese
officials. 4 23 The new agreement also allowed limited beyond rights

413.
414.
415.

See id.
See Carey, supranote 382, at 28.
See CivilAviation Accord, supranote 394; Key Issues, supra note 412.

416.

See Nomani, supranote 212, at 2; Risky Takeoff, supranote 234.

See Civil Aviation Accord, supranote 394; Key Issues, supra note 412.
417.
Risky Takeoff, supra note 234. As early as 1995, ANA was planning
418.
flights to New York and Honolulu from Osaka, if it were given the power to do so
under a new agreement. See ANA Aligns with U.S., supranote 281.
See Risky Takeoff, supranote 234.
419.
See Key Issues, supranote 412.
420.
See Feldman, supra note 158, at 58; Pacific Routes, supra note 163.
421.
The estimated value of beyond rights varied greatly. A United analyst estimated
beyond rights were worth $100 billion over twenty years. See UAL Sees $100
Billion U.S. Stake in Asian Markets, supra note 128. The non-incumbent airlines
attacked the United estimate with a Coopers & Lybrand study that found the
rights worth a maximum of $5.5 billion over twenty years. See Access: U.S.-Japan
Study Says United Claims Are Exaggerated,supranote 128.
See United Claims Japanese Will 'Eat Us Alive' Across the Pacific, ASIAN
422.
AVIATION NEws, Dec. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11187932 [hereinafter Eat Us
Alive].
See Wald, supra note 396. Federal Express had established a cargo
423.
base in the Philippines and had unsuccessfully sought approval to increase its
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for Polar Air Cargo and United Parcel Service. 4 2 4 In addition, the
agreement permits an additional U.S. cargo carrier to fly into
4 25
Japan in four years.
2. Code-Sharing
The allowance for code-sharing agreements, one of the last
major stumbling blocks to an agreement, took a creative solution.
At the United States' request, Japan readily agreed to allow for all
alliances between U.S. and Japanese carriers. 4 2 6 However,
Japan's ban of same-country alliances caused problems. A same
country alliance ban would not have allowed any flights between
Japan and the United States under the newly-formed NorthwestContinental alliance. 4 27 As a compromise, Japan agreed to lift its
ban to allow twenty-eight flights a week under same-country
partnerships, 4 28 but only if those partnerships contained only one
partner serving Japan from mainland U.S. airports. 4 2 9 In
addition, the United States had to agree that Japan Air System
(JAS), Japan's third-largest carrier, would be guaranteed a U.S.
partner. 3 0 Northwest Airlines, which already has a limited
relationship with JAS,4 1 has expressed interest in a code-sharing
3 2
arrangement with the airline.
Now that the agreement is completed, JAL and American's
alliance is expected to become more expansive. 3 Prior to the
agreement, JAL and American's partnership was limited to
frequent flyer program cooperation and a limited cargo handling
4
agreement.3

flights through Japan to China, Manila, Jakarta, and Bangkok. See Nomani &
Blackmon, supranote 151, at A3.
424.
See Civil Aviation Accord, supranote 394; Wald, supranote 396.
425.
See Civil Aviation Accord, supranote 394.
426.
See Key Issues, supranote 412.
427.
See id
428.
See id.; Civil Aviation Accord, supranote 394.
429.
See Civil Aviation Accord, supranote 394.
430.
See Kohei Murayama, Japan, U.S. Set for Aviation Deal Possibly by
Friday,Japan Economic Newswire, Jan. 23, 1998, available in WESTLAW, JWIRE
database.
431.
See Tony Kennedy, N-WA Seeks Alliance in Bid to Compete Effectively in
Japan,STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Jan. 15 1998, at 1D, available in
1998 WL 6337418. Northwest and JAS operated complimentary frequent flyer
agreements and flight schedules. See id.
432.
See id.
433.
See Aviation Talks Resume, supra note 315; U.S. Airlines Now Calling
for Less Than Open Skies, WORLD AIRLINE NEWs, June 20, 1997, available in 1997
WL 8541750 [hereinafter CallingforLess].
434.
See Callingfor Less, supranote 433.
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ANA and Delta operate a similar limited alliance, and the two
airlines have publicly stated that they would code-share flights
from Los Angeles to Tokyo and Osaka if an agreement was
reached. 4 35 However, aviation analysts believe ANA may try to
4 36
break its agreement with Delta and code-share with United.
3. Expanding U.S.-Japan Service Predicted
Before U.S. airlines may begin new service, their routes must
be approved through the U.S. Department of Transportation's
regulatory process.4 7 American is expected to request new flights
to Tokyo and Osaka from Chicago, as well as increased flights
from Dallas.4 8 Dallas airport officials expect American to get two
new flights a day from Dallas, including one additional flight to
Tokyo and a new flight to Osaka.4 9 Continental will likely ask for
service to Tokyo from Newark and Houston." 0 Delta is likely to
seek daily service to Tokyo, Osaka, and Fukuoka from Portland,
plus daily service to Tokyo from Atlanta. 44 1 Northwest is going to
take advantage of its beyond rights and begin additional service
from Seattle to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Jakarta, Indonesia
through Osaka.4 42 Northwest may add even more service to Japan
and its Asian markets because of its new alliance with
44 4
Continental. 4 3 TWA would like to service Tokyo from St. Louis.
United expects to boost the number of flights it currently operates
from Chicago to Tokyo from six to fourteen a week." 5 United was

435. See id.
436. See Wald, supranote 396.
437. See American May Get New Flight, DALLAS MORNING-NEWS, Jan. 15,
1998, at 2D, available in 1998 WL 2505292; Nomani & Blackmon, supra note
151, atA3.
438. See Air Traffic, supra note 313, at 32; Nomani & Blackmon, supranote
151, atA3.
439. See Dan Reed, U.S.-Japan Air Treaty Likely to Generate Flights, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 27, 1998, at 1, availablein 1998 WL 3272967.
440. See Air Traffic, supra note 313, at 32; Nomani & Blackmon, supranote
151, atA3; Schweltzer & Doming, supranote 171, at 1.
See Air Traffic, supra note 313, at 32; Nomani & Blackmon, supranote
441.
151, atA3; Schweltzer &Doming, supranote 171, at 1.
442. See New Flights,supranote 411; Northwest Reacts, supranote 399.
443. See John Schmeltzer, New Airline Alliance Announced, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
27, 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL 2818841. The Northwest/Continental
agreement was publicly announced just four days before the 1998 bilateral was
reached.
444. See Air Traffic, supra note 313, at 32; Nomani & Blackmon, supra note
151, at A3.
445. See New Flights, supra note 411. United expected the additional
Chicago-Tokyo flights to begin just nine weeks after the agreement was reached.
See id.
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also exploring
additional service increases from other U.S.
44 6
cities.
Like their American counterparts, both JAL and ANA plan to
boost capacity to the United States. 44 7 JAL initially plans to
increase flights to Los Angeles from Nagoya and to Honolulu from
Hiroshima. 448 ANA plans twenty-eight weekly round-trip flights
between Osaka and Honolulu, New York and Chicago." 9 ANA is
expected to take some time to begin all of its flights because
it has
45 0
a limited number of planes available for the expansion.
4. "Safety-net" Provision Encourages Japan to Conduct Further
Liberalization
The United States was careful to include a "safety net"
provision in the 1998 agreement that automatically allows for
more U.S. carrier access if no agreement is reached after the four
years of the pact. If fourth year negotiations fail, and no new
aviation agreement is reached, the non-incumbent U.S. carriers
will be permitted to fly an additional thirty-five weekly flights to
Japan. 4 1 If no agreement is reached within a year after the 1998
agreement expires, U.S. carriers can add twenty-one more weekly
flights to Japan. 45 2 In the third year after the expiration of the
agreement, U.S. carriers can add another seven unlimited flights
if no new agreement is reached. 45 3 And if no new agreement is
reached by the fifth year after the expiration of the 1998 accord,
then U.S. carriers are authorized seven more flights on limited
routes. 45 4 For the trigger to be implemented in each year, U.S.
carriers must be using fifty-six of the ninety new flights permitted
4 55
under the 1998 agreement.

446.
See New Flights, supranote 411.
447.
See JapanAirlines Targets U.S., Cuts Asia Flights,Dow Jones Intl News
Service, Jan. 20, 1998, available in WESTLAW, DJINS database; Price War, supra
note 403.
448.
See JapanAirlines Targets U.S. Cuts Asia Flights, Dow Jones Intl News
Service, Jan. 20, 1998, available in WESTLAW, DJNS database.
449.
See Price War, supranote 403.
450.
See id.
451.
See Civil Aviation Accord, supranote 394; Key Issues, supranote 412.
452.
See Civil Aviation Accord, supra note 394; Key Issues, supra note 412.

Fourteen of the additional twenty-one flights, must not be between Tokyo and
New York,
453.
454.
455.

Chicago, or Honolulu. See Key Issues, supranote 412.
See CivilAviation Accord, supranote 394; Key Issues, supranote 412.
See Civil AviationAccord, supranote 394; Key Issues, supranote 412.
See Key Issues, supranote 412.
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B. Concern Over Japan'sCommitment
As a warning to U.S. negotiators, the Washington Post
enumerated what aviation analysts predicted were the potential
pitfalls of an interim aviation agreement in an October 1997
editorial:
[A] partial liberalization could also be a big mistake. The United
States shouldn't accept a deal unless U.S. airlines' rights to fly
beyond Japan are spelled out with total clarity. Any deal should
allow U.S. airlines to compete based on price. And no deal will be
worth much unless it guarantees that Japan can't subvert it by
manipulating the availability of landing slots at Tokyo's Narita
airport, which already is overcrowded. Any ambiguity on these
matters is likely to be exploited in favor of Japanese carriers and to
45 6
the detriment of open competition.

The primary concern among skeptics of the aviation
agreement is that Japan will fail to follow through on its
commitment. Many of the aviation disputes that arose in the
1990s can be traced to Japan's unwillingness to follow the
provisions of the 1952 agreement. Japan does not always live up
to the expectations of U.S. officials, as their reticence to honor the
beyond rights in the 1952 aviation agreement demonstrated.
Richard Hirst, the General Counsel of Northwest Airlines, echoed
the sentiments of many critics of a short-term agreement when he
stated in the midst of the July 1996 negotiations that, 'Japan has
followed a pattern of agreeing and then refusing to implement
what they have agreed to."45 7 Still others are concerned that by
allowing Japan to use its non-compliance under the 1952 treaty
as a "bargaining chip" in negotiations, the United States is only

sending Japan the message that non-compliance is acceptable.
That could spell disaster at the termination of the interim
agreement.
Aviation experts point to Federal Express and its inability to
get Japanese authorization to increase its flights beyond Japan as
a clear example of how the Japanese government can refuse to
live up to its commitments under aviation agreements. Despite
contentions from the U.S. government that the 1952 agreement
did not give Japan the power to prevent increased U.S. traffic
through Japan to other destinations in Asia, 45 8 the Japanese
government had refused since 1993 to allow beyond routes to

456. Semi-Open Skies, supranote 24, at A24.
457. Poisedto Renounce, supranote 294, at 8.
458. See Brosnan, supra note 219, at B3; Japan, United States Remain at
Impasse Over Air Cargo Issue, ASIAN AVIATION NEWS, July 14, 1995, available in
1995 WL 6690537 [hereinafter Impasse Over Air Cargo].
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China and Subic Bay in the Philippines. 4S 9 Aviation experts say
that Japan prevented the Federal Express expansion because it

felt that the additional routes would disadvantage Japan-based

cargo carriers. 4 60 Still, the United States imposed no sanctions
hoping instead to reach an agreement at the negotiating table. 4 6 1
Some airline executives have expressed concern that because
the agreement lets ANA into the U.S. market there will be no
incentive for Japan to come to the table to negotiate open
skies. 46 2 Other critics have said that by giving Japan "most of
what they want," the United States has "less leverage" in the
future.
1.

Landing Slots Availability a Concern

Greater access to the Japanese aviation market is useless
without the ability to land in Japan. Finding landing slots at
Japanese airports may be a major problem for U.S. carriers. 4 63 As
the Asian Aviation News stated in February of 1997, "[t]he most

scarce
access

competitive
....

464 As of

[aviation] asset [in Japan] is airport
May, 1997, U.S. carriers already had rights

to one-third of the landing slots at Tokyo's Narita airport. 4 65
Japan was not expected to give U.S. carriers more slots in Tokyo,
and those slots that were available at Osaka's Kansai were

459.
See Brosnan, supra note 219, at B3; Impasse Over Air Cargo, supra
note 458. Federal Express needed the route from Japan to Subic Bay to help it
operate out of its new hub located there. See Impasse Over Air Cargo, supra note

458.

460.

See Impasse Over Air Cargo, supranote 458. The Asian cargo market is

extremely competitive, and Japanese cargo carriers have been unable to match
U.S. carriers' price or its worldwide network reach. See Wrangle Over Access,
supra note 181.
461.
See Brosnan, supranote 219, atB3.
462.
See Fifth Round, supra note 322, at 1D. The Tacoma News Tribune
editorialized during negotiations that a temporary agreement might give Japanese
air carriers greater access "with little assurance that Japan would reciprocate.
Such an outcome could hardly be characterized as fair trade or open skies."
Open Skies Goal, supranote 160, at A12.
463.
See Michiyo Nakamoto, US and Japanto Sign Airline Accord, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 31, 1998, at 2, available in 1998 WL 3529086. Japan claims that
no more landing slots were available at Tokyo's Narita, and it stopped allocating
new slots in 1990. See id.
464.
Japan'sMajor Airlines Vie for Space at Home and Across the Pacific,
ASIAN AVIATION NEwS, Feb. 21, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 8469126.
465.
See David Knibb, Battle of Wills, AIRLINE BUS., May 1, 1997, at 1,
available in 1997 WL 9065598. Records for the summer of 1997 showed that of
the 2,354 weekly landing slots for passenger and cargo flights at Narita Airport,
Japanese airlines had 860 and the U.S. carriers had 804. See Common Ground,
supra note 300, at 207. Of the 804 U.S. slots, Northwest operated 316, United
had 218, Federal Express had 144, Continental had 48, American had 40, Delta
had 26, and United Parcel Service had 12. See id.
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"guard[ed by Japan] like pearls."4 6 6 The 1998 agreement does not
include any net increase in landing and takeoff slots, but it does
shuffle some unused slots among U.S. carriers. 4 6 7 The agreement
calls for Federal Express to sell its unused landing/takeoff slots
at Tokyo's Narita Airport to the other U.S. carriers who have
gained access under the agreement. 4 6 8 Some carriers have
already expressed concern that Federal Express is asking too high
of a price, particularly since any unused slots should be returned
to the Japanese government at no charge. 4 69 For its part, Japan
has agreed to let the transfer take place as a commercial
transaction without getting deeply involved. 4 70 The U.S.
Transportation Department is also trying to stay above the fray,
according to Alan Larson, who stated that that the
landing/takeoff slot arrangements "need to be worked out by the
private sector."47 1 In addition to the twenty-eight Federal Express
slots, Japan also "secretly" promised to increase landings at
Narita from twenty-eight to thirty or thirty-one per hour and give

preference to U.S. carriers in the allocation of the new slots. 4 72

Early in the aviation negotiations, Northwest Airlines stressed
the importance of landing slots, calling the Japanese offer of new
routes "useless" without landing capacity. 473 United and
American executives countered Northwest's dire prediction by
explaining that a new runway will soon be completed at Tokyo's
Narita airport and that Osaka's Kansai airport might provide a

less constrained alternative in the meantime. 474 This new
runway, expected to open in the year 2000, 4 7 5 will reportedly

increase landing capacity by fifty percent. 4 76 However, the two
Japanese airlines are expected to receive half of the landing

466.
467.
468.

Knibb, supranote 465, at 1.
See Wald, supranote 396.
See id.

469. See id.
470. See id.
471. Id.
472. Japan to Offer Daytime Slots for U.S. Air Carriers, Japan Economic
Newswire, Jan. 30, 1998, available in WESTLAW, JWIRE database. The twentyeight per hour limit stems from labor contracts and noise reduction agreements.
See id.
473. See Gordon, supra note 360, at 2D. Sen. Jesse Helms also expressed
concern about limited landing slots when the Japanese indicated more routes
could be made available to Japanese airlines if U.S. carriers gave up some of the
slots they already had at Japanese airports. See Japan Waits, supra note 371, at
425.
474. See Loven, supra note 356; United Airlines: CEO Issues Statement on
US/Japan Air Talks, M2 Presswire, Sept. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL
14464420.
475. See JapaneseCarriers,supranote 101; Risky Takeoff, supra note 234.
476. See Booz Allen Study, supranote 127.
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slots. 47 7 Osaka's Kansai airport announced in April 1997 that it is
at capacity and does not have any further landing slots
available. 478 Kansai, which was completed in September of 1994,
operates its single runway twenty-four hours a day. 4 7 9 Although
Kansai was constructed to serve Osaka's international traffic,
Japanese officials have allowed JAL and ANA to use its precious
slots for domestic service. 48 0 Construction on a second runway
and terminal will not begin until 1999, and neither will be
481
operational until 2007.
2. Japanese Airline Competition for Japanese Passengers
Japanese travelers' strong preference for Japanese airlines
greatly concerns the U.S. carriers. As long as the U.S. carriers
remain less expensive, the Japanese traveler undoubtedly will fly
with them. But as Japanese carriers become more competitive
and offer more flights to the United States, U.S. carriers may have
reason to be worried. A consultant working for Northwest Airlines
concluded that an "overwhelming number" of new Japanese
travelers will fly Japanese airlines if those airlines are given more
access to the U.S. market.48 2 According to the consultant,
48 3
Japanese travelers prefer Japanese airlines by a 3-1 margin.
The preference is even more important because Japanese
travelers and other foreign nationals account for eighty percent of
48 4
those flying between the United States and Japan.
Also disconcerting to U.S. airlines is the relative advantage
Japanese carriers have in booking Japanese passenger tickets.
JAL and ANA have greater leverage in dealing with Japanese tour
wholesalers. 48 5 These wholesalers control the ticket pricing and
distribution system in Japan and are seen as essential to

477.
See Risky Takeoff, supranote 234.
478.
See Osaka Kansai May Have to Shift Domestic Service, 328 AVIATION
DALY 67 (1997).
479.
See id. That single runway can support 160,000 departures a year. See

id.
480.
See id.
481.
See id. To make matters worse, Kansai airport was constructed on an
island which makes expansion more difficult and time consuming. See id. Airport
officials noted that ff airport expansions are not done carefully, they will sink into

the ocean-literally. See id.
482.
Kennedy, supra note 125, at 1D. See NWA-Backed GKMG Study Sees
Demographic Risk in Japanese Proposal,329 AvIATION DAiLY 483 (1997) (stating
that Japanese travelers prefer home-country airlines by a 3 to 1 margin)
[hereinafter GKMG Study].
483.
See Kennedy, supra note 125, at 1D; GKMG Study, supra note 482, at
483.
484.
See Goldman, supranote 117, at 6; Kennedy, supranote 125, at ID.
485.
See Yenfor Japan,supranote 122, at 112.
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developing a significant passenger base. 4 8 6 The new agreement
does allow for U.S. carriers to own travel agencies and ticket
distribution systems in Japan, 4 87 but the Japanese carriers will
still dominate the domestic ticket handling market.

VI. THE JAPANESE AGREEMENT: SETTING A STANDARD
The United States and United Kingdom currently operate
international flights between the two countries under a 1977
agreement known as Bermuda 11.488 U.S. officials consider the
agreement highly restrictive and hope to renegotiate a more
liberal pact in the near future. 4 89 At hearings before the House of
Representatives in 1997, Transportation Department officials
noted that in 1993 the United Kingdom committed itself to
"aviation liberalization within a year," but that U.K. negotiators
have refused to let go of the "protectionist framework" of the
Bermuda II agreement. 4 90 Prior to Bermuda II, U.S. carriers had
beyond rights to fly from the United Kingdom into Europe, but
those rights were canceled under the agreement. 4 9 1 United
Airlines blames Bermuda II for British Airways' "dominance of the
trans-Atlantic business" and claims that it has cost the United
4 92
States "billions of dollars in revenue and thousands of jobs."
Others have agreed, saying that Bermuda II gave British Airways
a "stranglehold on London's Heathrow [airport] that has helped it
become the largest international airline in the world."493 Under
Bermuda II, only American Airlines and United Airlines may serve
Heathrow.494 British carriers now control sixty percent of the
U.K.-U.S. passenger service market. 4 9 s More than thirteen million
passengers travel between the United States and the United
Kingdom each year.496

486. Id
487. See Wald, supranote 396.
488. See Kayal, supranote 131, at 1A (discussing the 1977 agreement).
489. See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13; Momentum Slows, supra
note 50.
490. Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
491. See Eat Us Alive, supranote 422; Kayal, supranote 131, at 1A.
492. Eat Us Alive, supranote 422.
493. Kayal, supra note 131, at 1A. British Airways, with about $930 million
in pre-tax profits is the "best in the industry." James Srodes, Alliance? Open
Sides? It's Really a Merger, and They're Not Really Open; So Ground Both Plans,
BARRON'S, Jan. 12, 1998, at 49.

494.
495.
496.

See Kayal, supra note 131, at 1A.
See Dasburg Senate Testimony, supranote 1.
See Srodes, supranote 493, at 49.
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Aviation talks have been underway between the United States
and the United Kingdom for years, but they have been at a
relative standstill. Talks were suspended in February 1997, but
resumed in 1998. 49 7 As of August 1998, talks were scheduled to
continue into the fall. 4 98 Aviation analysts note that even though
the United States has had luck negotiating open skies with many
smaller countries, Japan and the United Kingdom are the "giants"
and present more resourceful adversaries than most countries:
"Positioned at the top of the world on opposite sides of the United
States, these two island nations are American's most lucrative
aviation markets and the entry points to the prosperous
economies of their hemispheres."4 9 9 One-third of all U.S.European air traffic goes through Britain, and London's Heathrow
is the busiest international airport in the world.5 0 0 Not
surprisingly, aviation analysts have compared the United
Kingdom to Japan, noting that both countries are masters at
using their geographical location and economic strength as
50
leverage in negotiations. '
A. CriticsAssert Agreement Weakens the U.S. BargainingPosition
Even before the final four-year agreement was reached, U.S.
airline executives were concerned that the United States
government was not forcefully advocating its position. As a result,
some feared that the government would not be able to stand up to
foreign countries in aviation negotiations. Federal Express
Chairman Frederick Smith, speaking before the Senate Aviation
Subcommittee in 1996, said that the United States was too timid
S0 2
in responding to Japan's violations under the 1952 agreement.
Specifically, Smith claimed that rather than standing up to the
Japanese when they made threats to limit beyond rights in
violation of the 1952 aviation agreement, U.S. negotiators caved
in and granted additional cargo access to Japanese carriers in the
Chicago market.5 0 3 Smith compared the situation to a fight in

497. See Carole A. Shifrin, U.S., U.K. To Resume Open Skies Talks, AVIATION
WK. & SPAcE TEcH., Aug. 10, 1998, at 38, availablein 1998 WL 8145112.
498
See id.
499. Kayal, supranote 131, at 1A.
500. See id.; Srodes, supra note 493, at 49.
501.
See Kayal, supranote 131, at 1A.
502. See Timid Stance, supranote 279, at 425. Smith was so concerned with
the state of aviation negotiations that he sought-and got-a meeting with
President Clinton. See Flying Circus, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1998, at A14. The
meeting lasted forty-five minutes, and shortly thereafter, Federal Express gave
$100,000 to the Democratic National Committee for its 1996 election efforts. See
id.
503. See Timid Stance, supranote 279, at 425.
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"50 4
which "[t]hey punch us in the nose and get rewarded.
Although the immediate results of the 1996 cargo talks were

particularly upsetting to Smith, he expressed additional concern
for what conclusions other countries may have drawn from the
U.S. actions: "One can only imagine the long-term impact of a
U.S. negotiating strategy so timid that [the government of Japan]
feels free to threaten the shutdown of an existing U.S. cargo
operation in Asia if the U.S. does not accept restrictions
demanded by the Government of Japan."5 0 5 Smith stressed that
China is beginning to follow a negotiating strategy similar to that
of Japan-threatening restrictions in hopes of gaining negotiating
50 6
leverage.
Northwest Airlines, upset at the U.S. negotiating strategy
early on in the talks, also indicated its belief that other nations
would take their negotiating cues from the U.S.-Japan talks.
Northwest CEO John Dasburg said during negotiations that if
Japan was successful in getting the United States to agree to its
objectives that "it would signal that the United States is willing to
allow constraint of a trade sector when a foreign country deems it
to be too competitive."5 0 7 Dasburg noted that China and other
countries were "closely watching" aviation negotiations.5 0
Dasburg laid out Northwest's concerns before the Senate Aviation
Subcommittee in 1997:
The precedent we set in U.S.-Japan aviation relations has
implications far broader than the United States' current air service
balance of trade surplus. To the extent we agree to something less
than Open Skies in substance and name, we will, in effect, be
telling Japan and other trading partners that maintaining managed
5 09
competition relationships is permissible.

Robert Eaton, the CEO of Chrysler, also claimed that the
aviation talks would impact trade negotiations and have

ramifications beyond the aviation markets.510 Eaton stated during
negotiations that a failure to reach an open skies accord would
"signal to the rest of us who are watching, that we should trade in

our hopes for free markets and open competition as we watch
Japan and the rest of the governments in Asia carve up their
51
markets." '

504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.

Id.
Id. (brackets and capitalization in original)
See id.
Dasburg Senate Testimony, supranote 1.
Id.
Id.
See Kennedy, supranote 125, at 1D.
Id.
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On Capitol Hill, Senator Jesse Helms put pressure on the
administration during negotiations to accept nothing less than
open skies.5 1 2 In a letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
Helms noted that of the forty-five "market-opening agreements"
signed between the United States and Japan since 1980, only
5 13
thirteen had resulted in opening markets to U.S. businesses.
Senator Helms argued that without an open skies agreement
"Japan will conclude that the US is not serious about
deregulation and market opening and will act accordingly."5 1 4 In
addition, Helms asserted that other countries in the region would
also see the agreement as a signal that they too could continue
protectionism. 51 5 Helms became so disturbed at the direction U.S.
negotiators were going with the aviation talks that he sent staff
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to observe
the August 1997 discussions. S 16 In January of 1998, as aviation
negotiations were nearing an end, Helms "warned" the Clinton
administration not to conclude an agreement until he held Senate
hearings on the state of U.S.-Japan aviation relations in
5 17
February.
B. U.S. Officials: Aviation Agreements Must be Pragmatic
United States officials respond to their critics by pointing out
that each country presents a unique situation-politically and
economically-that must be handled in a pragmatic fashion.
Charles Hunnicutt, the Transportation Department Assistant
Secretary in charge of international aviation policy, told the
Senate Aviation Subcommittee in 1997 that even given the goal of
reaching open skies agreements, U.S. policy "recognizes that some
countries are not prepared to fully embrace open skies
immediately."5 18 When a country refuses to accept open skies
after U.S. encouragement, Hunnicutt said it is policy to "work

512.
See Japan Waits, supranote 371, at 425.
513. Id.
514. Nancy Dunne, Helms Demands Air Accord Hearing,FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 16, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 3525590 [hereinafter Helms Demands
Hearings].
515.
See id.
516.
See Senate Foreign Relations Observers Add New Twist to U.S.-Japan
Talks, 329 AvIATION DAILY 359 (1997). The Senate staff members were asserting
only persuasive power because aviation agreements are not considered treaties in
the official sense, so they do not require Senate approval. See Carey, supra note
382, at 28; Helms Demands Hearings,supranote 514, at 4.
517.
Helms Demands Hearings, supranote 514, at 4.
518.
Hunnicutt Senate Testimony, supranote 32.
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with the country to develop alternatives."5 19 In Hunnicutt's view,
that is precisely what happened in U.S.-Japanese negotiations.
As for the United Kingdom, United States officials are hoping
that a tentative partnership agreement between American Airlines
and British Airways will pressure the British government to
accept aviation liberalization.5 20 Under the U.S. strategy, the
United States will only grant the needed antitrust immunity to the
partnership if U.S. carriers can make inroads into the British
aviation market and ensure competition.5 2 1 The United States has
explicitly told the United Kingdom that it will not approve
antitrust immunity for the agreement if "the essential open-skies
elements are not present."5 2 2 The United States is hoping that
British Airways, in pursuing its own interest, will effectively lobby
the British government to reach a new agreement -with the United
States. The antitrust leverage may have worked to some extent.
One publication noted that the announcement of the American
Airlines-British Airways deal "jump-started" talks that had been
stalled for years.5 2 3 Furthermore, the proposed partnership was
driver in whether Britain
reportedly the "single most important
24
joins Washington's open-skies club."9
Aside from the logistics of the American Airlines-British
Airways venture, current U.S.-U.K. talks are stalled because of a
major dispute as to whether landing rights into Heathrow airport

519. Id. U.S. officials are also beginning to recognize that open skies
agreements are not necessarily the only way of significantly increasing U.S. airline
access around the world. See Fotos, supra note 84, at 25. The reason is that code
sharing agreements are often more efficient means of getting access to
international passengers who are already comfortable flying their national
carriers. See id. Experts at the Washington, D.C.-based Economic Strategy
Institute agreed with the pragmatic approach, arguing that the United States
should first insist on open skies, but agree if necessary to "transitional
arrangements." Think Tank Calls for Open Skies in U.S.-Japan Aviation Talks,
WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Mar. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8067416.
520. See Momentum Slows, supra note 50. The British Airways-American
Airlines partnership agreement was reached in June 1996, but it requires U.S.
approval. See Baliles, supranote 13.
521. See Baliles, supra note 13.
522. Murphy House Testimony, supra note 13. In what has been called "a
bit of brinkmanship," the United Kingdom has asked the United States to approve
the partnership between American Airlines and British Airways prior to any open
skies agreement. See Open Skies Talks, supranote 46, at B6.
523. See Kayal, supranote 131, at 1A.
524. Id. Aviation experts have criticized the British Airways-American
Airlines agreement, and argued that if the two airlines are allowed to operate
jointly they would control too much of the U.S.-U.K. market-including all flights
between London's Heathrow and Dallas and Boston. See Srodes, supra note 493,
at 49.
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should be expanded for U.S. carriers.5 2s Other issues in dispute
526
include pricing, beyond rights, groundhandling, and security.
In addition, the American Airlines-British Airways agreement
remains caught up in both British and European Union
regulatory proceedings.5 2 7 Overall, however, the United States
and the United Kingdom agreed that open skies should be the
norm.5 28 The real issue for the two countries is exactly what open
5 29
skies means in terms of implementation.

VII. CONCLUSION
Although smaller countries in Europe, Central America, and
Asia embraced open skies agreements with the United States,
convincing other nations to sign such agreements will continue to
grow more difficult for U.S. officials. The United States essentially
chose to target less problematic nations first. Now, talks with the
larger countries, with whom the United States has more complex
trade relations, are generally stalled.5 3 0 The reason for the slow
down of negotiations for successful open skies agreements is
simple: some countries have less to gain in opening up their
aviation markets to U.S. carriers. Like Japan and the United
Kingdom, some countries place a high priority on protecting their
national carriers from increased U.S. competition. Other
countries, like China, want to use their large aviation market as
leverage in overall international trade negotiations. Greg
Principato, an advisor to ACCESS U.S.-Japan, summed up the
growing reluctance in the world community to agree to open skies
with the United States: "Smaller countries without (much) clout
can be made to agree to a certain formula .... The countries with
more clout have more interests, and they're going to negotiate

harder."531
525.
See Field, supra note 27, at 4B. Despite British concerns over
increasing U.S. airline access to Heathrow, the United Kingdom has agreed that
under an open skies regime Heathrow must be opened up to more than the two
U.S. carriers currently allowed rights. See Murphy House Testimony, supra note

13.
526.
See Murphy House Testimony, supranote 13.
527.
See Goldsmith, supra note 47, at A15. In 1998, the European
Commission approved the American Airlines/British Airvays alliance, but it
placed conditions on its approval. See Commission Outlines Ground Rules for
TransAtlanticAir Market, EUR. REP. July 11, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 8802801.

Therefore, the alliance may still be mired in EC red tape, unless the two airlines
follow the EC guidelines. See id.
528.
See Kayal, supranote 131, at IA.
529.
See id.

530.

See Field, supranote 27, at 4B.

531.

Kayal, supranote 131, at 1A (alteration in original).

1270

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:1207

Given the wide variety of economic and political pressures
faced by foreign governments within their own countries, a U.S.
policy that each nation capitulate and adopt open skies would be
counterproductive.
No nation would be receptive to such
ultimatums. By insisting upon open skies without providing any
alternatives, the United States would essentially be forcing its will
on other nations. Aviation talks would not be "negotiations," but
merely U.S. cajoling sessions intent on forcing other countries to
accept what the U.S. deems to be in the other nation's best
interests.
Some blamed the United States and its continued insistence
on open skies for the protracted U.S.-Japan negotiations. At the
height of U.S-Japan negotiations in the fall of 1997, the Singapore
Straits Times accused the United States of stalling negotiations:
"It was precisely because of these sustained attempted to
browbeat weaker partners that, in spite of protracted talks, the

Americans still have not been able to come to an agreement with
the Japanese." S32 This criticism is likely to be repeated in the
future unless the United States continues to embrace a flexible
approach to international aviation policy.
The perception among foreign nations is that when it comes
to allowing foreign carriers to fly domestic routes, giving them
beyond rights, or allowing joint arrangements between foreign and
U.S. carriers, "the Americans expect far more than they are
prepared to concede."5 33 Many countries point out that the U.S.
domestic aviation market is large, and that it provides a strong
revenue base for U.S. airlines who want to expand into
international markets. This solid domestic market is the "basic
asymmetry in all U.S. discussions with other nations."5 34 In
essence, foreign countries harbor a belief that U.S. carriers get an
unfair advantage in all liberalization agreements because U.S.
airlines can exploit the U.S. domestic market while their foreign
competitors are locked out.53 5 The foreign critics of open skies pin
their allegations of "unfair" free trade on this domestic market
regulation. Even those who agree that the "economic pie gets
bigger when you open markets and compete" believe that the
532. Asian Sky, supranote 143. Furthermore, the paper took issue with the
United States efforts to pressure European nations to allow U.S. carriers to pick
up passengers in one European destination and fly them to other European
destinations. See id. The paper stated that the U.S. actions were unfair because
the United States does not allow foreign carriers to fly passengers from one

destination to another within the United States. See id.
533. Id.
534. Beyond Rights, supranote 168.
535. See id. Those who support the U.S. policy of protecting the domestic
market from foreign competition point out that the U.S. domestic market is highly

competitive and would not likely create any profit for foreign airlines. See id.
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foreign governments have "every right to point out that the biggest
5 36
slice seem[s] reserved for the US."
Economists may agree that open skies, like free trade across

all sectors, would be of most benefit to trading partners. But
political pressures make that ideal difficult to achieve. The Far
East Economic Review, focusing on Japan's aviation trade deficit
with the United States, found that the United States "was dead
right" in arguing that open skies will be in Japan's best
interests.5 37 Yet, the publication adopted a tone critical to the
United States, stating that the United States, which itself has
been concerned about large trade deficits with Japan, should not
have been surprised by Japan's reluctance to open itself up to
further U.S. competition in the airline industry.5 3 8 Others also
noted that Japanese government officials had reason to approach
open skies skeptically: "For obvious competitive reasons, Japan
is in no hurry to radically change the arrangement by allowing
foreign carriers to gain stronger footholds in that burgeoning
market."5 3 9
Just as Japan was reluctant to accept unconditional open
skies, other nations will manifest the same apprehension in
future aviation negotiations. While the United States should
continue to pursue its policy goal of open skies, it must be willing
to compromise. Each country's limitations, including the
economic and political context underlying negotiations, must be
considered. Taking an all-or-nothing open skies approach would
transform U.S. officials from negotiators into ultimatum
enforcers. Foreign nations would resent the implication that they
are to bend to U.S. wishes. As a result, foreign officials could
refuse to negotiate aviation accords altogether. The United States
would be left with the satisfaction of having a forceful and
principled aviation policy, but little else.
An international trade policy based on opening up markets
does not benefit U.S. interests unless it is implemented, and
successful implementation in economically competitive markets
would be unlikely under an all-or-nothing approach. The result of

536. Asian Sky, supranote 143.
537. Dogfight, supranote 4, at 5.
538. See id. As an editorial stated in August of 1997, "if Japan were to
succumb to the temptation to play the trade-deficit card here, would anyone
really blame them?' Id.
539. Open Skies, supranote 160, at A12.
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an all-or-nothing open skies approach is simply to maintain the
status quo, which in many cases means inefficient, costly, and

artificially constrained air service for American and foreign
consumers alike.
Derek Lick*
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